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Both empirical and theoretical work in the field of personal epistemologies 
has indicated several epistemic factors that influence the way in which individuals 
approach information and knowledge formation. An organizational scheme is 
suggested for making sense of the various approaches to personal epistemologies 
and an integrative model of epistemic cognition that combines these elements along 
with contextual influences is proposed. Using a sample of 84 undergraduate and 
graduate students, 18 to 41 years of age, a mixed method approach was employed 
to begin investigations into the theoretical model. In an online information-seeking 
scenario on the, scientifically controversial but morally and politically neutral, topic 
of hand sanitizer, participants’ initial thoughts on the topic were captured with 
Likert-type survey items and their online behaviors tracked using Internet logfile 
data. Follow-up open response survey items questioned participants on their 
approaches to the sources of information and for justification of the opinions they 
formed after having access to the information. Survey data were also collected on 
each of the proposed components at the individual level of the model: epistemic 
strategies, development, and motivations. Using regression and multiple mediation 
analyses the connections between contextual factors and individual and task-
specific epistemic factors were explored. This indicated evidence of mediation of 
the relationship between epistemic development and the types of sources and time 
spent reading information by one of the proposed epistemic motivations, need for 
cognition. Regression analyses also revealed a lack of relationship between 
epistemic behaviors in the task and perceived sufficiency of information suggestive 
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of either an interaction between variables or influence by additional latent factors 
influencing standards for what counts as sufficient information as the basis of a 
justified opinion. Mixed method analyses indicated few significant differences in 
the types or amount of evidence that individuals provide as justification related to 
epistemic development, motivation, or strategies. However, mixed-methods analyses 
involving comparison of quantitative and qualitative measures revealed individual 
differences in the amount to which interest in the topic and risk perception 
influenced both the quantity and quality of the information accessed. This suggests 
the need to account for the influence of epistemic self-regulation and epistemic 
metacognition in an overall model of epistemic cognition.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Epistemic cognition, the cognitive process through which individuals form 
knowledge, and the various influences on that process is an emerging topic within 
the field of educational psychology. Although the term has been in use for some 
time, up to this point epistemic cognition has largely been used to describe thoughts 
and reflections about the nature of, and criteria for, knowing (K. S. Kitchener, 
1983). The term personal epistemologies (Hofer & Pintrich, 2002) has been used in a 
similar way, with the focus of the field largely on individual attitudes towards, and 
beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing. The construct definition of 
personal epistemologies has been highly contested (Hofer, 2002) and three distinct 
approaches can be found within the literature. The predominant approach centers 
on personal epistemologies as a developmental scheme that describes individuals as 
increasing in their view of knowledge as tentative and constructed (Baxter 
Magolda, 2001; Bromme, Kienhues, & Stahl, 2007; King & Kitchener, 1994; Perry, 
1970; Schommer, 1990a). Another approach to personal epistemologies is one of 
describing the motivational traits that influence the way individuals approach 
knowledge formation (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; DeBacker & Crowson, 2006; 
Kruglanski, 1990; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Researchers are also increasingly 
investigating the notion of personal epistemologies as specific knowledge-building 
strategies and modes of justification, although some researchers have also portrayed 
acquisition and application of strategies as a more fine-grained developmental 





Several different concepts, each broadly identified as personal epistemologies 
have been indicated as having influences on various aspects of learning and 
cognition. This includes the influence of epistemic development on standard setting in 
self-regulated learning (Bromme, Pieschl, & Stahl, 2010; Muis & Franco, 2009), 
comprehension tasks (Ryan, 1984; Schommer, 1990a) and metacognitive 
calibration (Stahl, Pieschl, & Bromme, 2006) and the influences of epistemic 
motivations on depth of processing, achievement, and learning goals (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982; DeBacker & Crowson, 2006; Kruglanski, 1990; Webster & Kruglanski, 
1994). Initial investigations into epistemic strategies also indicate influences on 
learning, with Muis and Franco (2010) showing that individuals who report the use 
of a combination of rational and empirical strategies show higher rates of 
metacognitive strategy use, cognitive regulation, and problem solving achievement 
(Muis & Franco, 2010). A more recent study has also indicated that the match 
between the way knowledge is represented in instructional texts and the student’s 
predominant epistemic strategy has implications for recall, processing strategies, 
and conceptual change (Franco, Muis, Kendeou, Ranellucci, & Sampasivam, 
2012). However, while some studies have looked at how two of these three 
components might have a joint influence on individual approaches to knowledge 
construction and performance on ill-structured tasks (Kardash & Scholes, 1996; 
Nussbaum & Bendixen, 2003), as the proposed components have not previously 
been organized in this way studies have not sought to investigate how all three 
components might work together to influence behaviors during knowledge 
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construction. Given the links between the three components: epistemic strategies, 
development, and motivations, and strategy selection and standard setting it seems 
that there would be a combined effect on epistemic standard setting and epistemic 
behaviors in knowledge forming contexts that had not been investigated prior to the 
current study. 
The need to investigate the influence within a context also relates to the 
problem raised in the literature of whether personal epistemologies are domain 
general or domain specific (Buehl, Alexander, & Murphy, 2002; Hofer, 2006a, 
2006b; Muis, Bendixen, & Haerle, 2006; Schommer & Walker, 1995). Studies into 
the issue of domain specificity-generality indicate that there are differences in the 
way individuals express their beliefs about knowledge in specific domains (Buehl & 
Alexander, 2005; Hofer, 2000, 2001). While the idea that there are domain 
differences in expressed personal epistemologies is now widely accepted, the way in 
which they relate to one another or to domain general beliefs is not clear (Hofer, 
2006b). This study attempted to address this by investigating whether there may be 
epistemic strategies, strategies specifically for attaining knowledge, that operate at 
both the general and specific levels. 
This comparison of the way epistemic strategies are expressed at the domain 
general and context-specific levels is hampered by another problem in the personal 
epistemologies literature, the lack of investigation and clear definition of the precise 
nature of epistemic strategies. Richter and Schmid (2010) define epistemic strategies 
as “a special type of cognitive learning strategies that are aimed at validating the 
knowledge claims raised in expository or informational texts” (p. 49). However, the 
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current study defines epistemic strategies more broadly as different approaches 
individuals take to the justification of beliefs, which may include but are not limited 
to validation of knowledge claims in text based resources. Although the term is not 
widely used epistemic resources (Hammer & Elby, 2002; Louca et al., 2004), styles 
(Royce, 1978, 1983), beliefs (Hennessey, 2007), and strategies (Richter & Schmid, 
2010) all seem to describe different aspects of epistemic strategy as defined in the 
current study. This study therefore further sought clarity on the nature of epistemic 
strategy, specifically by looking at the types of strategies individuals both use and 
report themselves as using in the online knowledge forming context, and how these 
specific strategies were related to strategies captured by the epistemic strategy 
instrument.   
A common conceptual and methodological problem with many of the 
investigations into personal epistemologies is the inclusion of ontological beliefs, or 
beliefs about the nature of reality in conceptualizations of personal epistemologies. 
Examples of this include Kitchener’s (1983) description of the epistemic assumption 
“that there is an objective reality” (p. 226), instrument items such as: “Scientists can 
ultimately get to the truth” and “If scientists try hard enough, they can find the 
truth to almost anything” (Schommer, 1990b) and “Experts in this field can 
ultimately get to the truth” (Hofer, 2000). Questions about ontological viewpoints 
have also been included as factors forming part of dimensional models of personal 
epistemologies (Greene, Azevedo, & Torney-Purta, 2010), for example “attainment 
of truth” (Hofer, 2000). Inclusion of ontological issues in the personal 
epistemologies literature are problematic on two counts, the first being the question 
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of whether or not individuals really reflect on the nature of reality (Hofer, 2002), 
and the second being the oversimplification of the realist stance as being necessarily 
dualist in nature (Greene et al., 2010). 
A final methodological issue relates to the lack of accounting for the 
influence of context in many studies of personal epistemologies. This is particularly 
the case in those studies that combine two or more of the concepts from the 
personal epistemologies literature. One example of a study that does take into 
account some contextual factors is the Richter and Schmid (2010) study looking at 
the relationships between epistemic beliefs, attitudes, and strategies on self-
regulated learning while reading an unfamiliar text. However this study focused 
only on the specific epistemic strategies students used as influenced by beliefs, 
attitudes, and processing goals and did not look at the learning outcome of the task 
and its relation to these contextual factors related to the topic. There is therefore a 
gap in the literature looking at the combined effect of the three broad areas of 
personal epistemologies (i.e., strategies, development, and motivations) that have 
so far been studied separately, on approaches to knowledge formation and the 
outcomes of knowledge formation tasks in specific contexts. Furthermore, there is a 
clear need to include contextual influences in any investigations into the effects of 
these components on epistemic standard setting, behaviors, and outcomes. 
The main problems in the personal epistemologies literature that this study 
therefore sought to address was the gap in the literature regarding how these three 
disparate areas of the field are linked, and their combined influence on knowledge-
forming behaviors in a context. Although the study was situated in an online 
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context on a scientifically controversial topic, the hope was that the study would 
begin to uncover links and influences of the three components on knowledge-
forming standards and processes to facilitate a more thorough understanding of 
epistemic cognition. The focus of this study is on these links, influences, and the 
overall epistemic cognition process to shed some light on some of the construct 
definition issues, including the domain general versus domain specific nature of 
approaches to knowledge by investigating the influence of domain general, 
individual-level components, on a context-specific knowledge construction task. 
This study also began to uncover the nature of epistemic strategies actually 
possessed and utilized by individuals in knowledge formation situations. Finally, 
this study narrowed the focus of personal epistemologies by removing ontology 
dimensions (nature of truth) from the construct definition and shifting the focus 
purely onto notions of knowledge and knowing.  
 
Research Questions 
Given the problems identified in the literature as described above, the 
research questions focused on the links between the proposed components of 
epistemic cognition at both the domain general and context specific levels. There 
was also an additional focus on identifying the epistemic strategies used in context. 
The research questions were as follows: 
1. How are domain-general epistemic strategies, development, and motivations 
related to the epistemic standards set and epistemic behaviors displayed in a 
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specific knowledge-forming context? 
a. Do epistemic motivations act as a mediator between epistemic development, 
strategies and the standards set in a knowledge-forming context? 
b. Which of the proposed epistemic motivations – need for closure or need for 
cognition – has the greatest impact on epistemic standard setting and 
epistemic behaviors displayed in an online knowledge-forming context? 
c. Which of the proposed contextual influences (i.e., interest, perceived 
personal risk, importance of understanding, and prior knowledge) has the 
greatest impact on epistemic standard setting and epistemic behaviors in a 
knowledge-forming context? 
2. How are epistemic standards and behaviors related in a knowledge-forming 
context? 
3. How is the repertoire of domain-general epistemic strategies and the epistemic 
strategies enacted in a knowledge-forming context related? 
a. What epistemic strategies emerge in a knowledge-forming context? 
b. Of the epistemic strategies that emerge in a knowledge-forming context, 
which of these are captured by the epistemic strategy instrument? 
 
Study Significance 
The study contributes to the field of personal epistemologies by providing 
some empirical support for the re-classification of previously studied components. 
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The study also opens important avenues for future research in standard setting, self-
regulation, and problem definition as possible further components of a model of 
epistemic cognition. This study investigated how the suggested components might 
act together in context, particularly in relation to epistemic standard setting and 




Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
The process through which individuals may attempt to distinguish true 
beliefs from false ones has been a heated topic in the fields of both philosophy and 
psychology. In philosophy, epistemology is the specific branch that seeks to 
conduct a “philosophical inquiry into the nature, conditions, and extent of human 
knowing” (Sosa & Kim, 2000, p. ix), while in psychology study the focus is more 
on individual “beliefs about knowledge and knowing” (Hofer, 2001, p. 354). 
Although it does seem to be the case that there are differences in the ways people 
treat knowledge and justification, including how they think about knowledge and 
knowing in more general terms, the idea that most individuals will have formed 
explicit personal theories of how knowledge is formed, acquired and justified does 
not seem to be supported by the literature (R. F. Kitchener, 2002; Muis & Franco, 
2009). 
Individual attitudes or beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing in 
the field of psychology are referred to variously in the literature as: personal 
epistemologies (Hofer, 2001), epistemological reflection, epistemic transformation, 
epistemological assumptions (Baxter Magolda, 2004), epistemic assumptions, reflective 
judgment (King & Kitchener, 1994), epistemic beliefs (Muis & Franco, 2009; Stahl & 
Bromme, 2007), epistemic criteria (Boldrin & Mason, 2009), epistemological resources 
(Louca et al., 2004) and epistemic values (Fallis & Whitcomb, 2009). The sheer 
volume of terminology applied to this field indicates the difficulties with construct 
definition and the divisions within the field. This study seeks to bring together these 
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varied approaches to defining personal epistemologies, by first conducting a 
thorough literature review into the various approaches to defining personal 
epistemologies, and subsequently carrying out an empirical investigation into the 
nature of the identified epistemic components, the relationships among them, and 
joint influences on behaviors in an online knowledge-forming context.  
The following overview of the literature seeks firstly to investigate the 
different ways in which personal epistemologies have been described and studied. 
The review was initially based on a search of personal epistemologies articles that 
use terminology from philosophy to apply to the psychological constructs they 
describe. The focus of the review is on the way that philosophical terminology is 
used in the personal epistemologies literature, and in particular on the 
inconsistencies between the psychological application and philosophical theories 
that the terms or labels came from originally. Philosophy, and specifically 
epistemology, is then used as a lens for understanding and clarifying the differences 
between approaches within the field of personal epistemologies. A second function 
of the review is to examine the empirical findings about the relationship of the 
different constructs to learning and information processing. Based on the existing 
literature I have sought to make theoretically and empirically feasible connections 
between the different approaches to personal epistemologies as well as propose a 
model representing the combined and individual impacts of the various approaches 
to personal epistemologies on knowledge building.  
Through an analysis of the literature, three major themes emerged in the 
way that researchers and theorists talk about personal epistemologies. These I have 
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labeled epistemic strategies, epistemic development, and epistemic motivations. From the 
initial finding, further key articles from the field of personal epistemologies were 
reviewed and found to be consistent with this coding approach. The distinction 
between these three components of the personal epistemologies research is used to 
organize the following literature review. Connections between the empirical 
findings and theoretical rationales for the three identified areas of the personal 
epistemologies literature are used to argue that there is strong justification for 
including each of these three approaches as a component of a hypothesized model 
of epistemic cognition. The final section of the literature review outlines the 
proposed model of how these three components might combine to influence 
epistemic standard setting and behaviors in a knowledge-forming context based on 
the influences on approaches to learning and knowledge formation indicated in the 
articles reviewed. 
 
Epistemological vs. Epistemic 
Both the terms epistemological and epistemic are used to describe beliefs, 
attitudes and approaches toward knowledge. However, it has been argued that 
researchers must be more careful to make the distinction between epistemological 
and epistemic (R. F. Kitchener, 2002). Given that epistemology means “theory of 
knowledge,” R. Kitchener (2002) argues that actually what most researchers are 
referring to is epistemic rather than epistemological. In light of this, it is important 
for us as researchers to reflect on whether what we are describing and attempting to 
capture really reflects well formed individually held theories of knowledge.  
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Since it seems unlikely that most individuals do in fact have well-articulated 
theories of knowledge (R. F. Kitchener, 2002; Muis & Franco, 2009), I suggest that 
it is more likely that what we are really looking at are the basic understandings, 
representations, attitudes towards, and specific strategies individuals have for 
attaining knowledge. Therefore, as suggested by R. Kitchener (2002), I will be using 
the term epistemic rather than epistemological as the prefix for each of the proposed 
components of the hypothesized model, to indicate that these are intended to 
describe dispositions, strategies, or a developmental progression with the aim of 
attaining truth and avoiding error as their goal rather than a reflection of more 
explicit theories of knowledge. 
 
Justified True Beliefs 
Unlike models of more general information processing, the model of 
epistemic cognition described in this literature review and investigated in this study is 
intended to show the process by which individuals arrive at knowledge, with 
knowledge defined more closely in line with classical philosophical thinking as 
justified true beliefs. According to the proposed model, the knowledge arrived at can 
only be considered knowledge if the individual believes it and there is some form of 
justification, be that reasoning processes used, information referred to, or some 
other justification process. This is in line with the idea that “warranted knowledge 
is generally taken to be that sub-set of our individual beliefs that are effectively 
argued to be true” (Hallett, Chandler, & Krettenauer, 2002).  
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Despite this definition of knowledge as in line with “justified true beliefs,” it 
is not within the scope of this study to attempt to define what truth is, or to provide 
a criterion for what constitutes adequate justification. As there is no agreed upon 
objective standard for justification, or standard provided by the current study, 
standards for justification are therefore taken as being set by the individual. In other 
words knowledge is, for the purposes of this study, the individual’s justified beliefs, 
with adequate justification set at whatever level the individual feels to be adequate 
in the given context in order to make a decision. This shifting criterion for knowing 
is termed epistemic standards in the proposed model and is defined as the standard 
set by the individual for adequate justification of their beliefs in the specific 
knowledge forming context. 
By removing any judgment of what constitutes truth from the model of 
epistemic cognition, I have sought to avoid some of the criticisms that there are 
confusions between epistemology and ontology in the personal epistemologies 
literature. Criticisms include questions about whether capturing individual 
ontologies are something we want to, or are even able to, accomplish due to the 
unlikelihood that the majority of individuals actually reflect on the nature of truth 
or reality (Hofer, 2002). Other criticisms include a question about use of the word 
“truth” in survey items to connote a naive realist perspective that is more reflective 
of the researchers’ oversimplification of the realist stance as being necessarily 





Three Approaches to Personal Epistemologies 
As previously described, the field of personal epistemology may be thought 
of as being composed of three distinct approaches to thinking about the way that 
individuals approach knowledge construction as well as how they think about 
knowledge and knowing. These include: epistemic strategies, epistemic development, 
and epistemic motivations. All three components have been shown individually to 
predict individual approaches to learning and cognition, particularly in ill-
structured domains (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; DeBacker & Crowson, 2006; 
Kruglanski, 1989; Muis & Franco, 2009, 2010; Ryan, 1984; Schommer, 1990a; 
Stahl et al., 2006; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). However, despite sharing similar 
influences on learning outcomes, these three different areas of personal 
epistemologies research have largely been seen as disparate conceptualizations. The 
following literature review seeks to firstly describe the three different approaches to 
personal epistemologies, and secondly show how these three approaches might be 
thought of as components of a model of epistemic cognition, which together 
influence epistemic standard setting and behaviors in information seeking and 
knowledge forming contexts. 
 
Epistemic development. The predominant area of personal epistemologies 
focuses on the shift from an absolutist epistemic stance, the view that information is 
either right or wrong, towards a more evaluative or relativist stance, in which 
individuals recognize the constructed nature of knowledge and knowing, while still 
understanding that there are criteria by which information can be evaluated. This 
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idea of epistemic development as a move toward a view of knowledge as 
increasingly constructed, and a view of self as an increasingly active agent in the 
knowledge formation process (Kuhn, 1999; Perry, 1970) also describes the goal of 
development as arriving at a view of knowledge as a “coordination of the objective 
and subjective dimensions of knowing” (Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000, p. 
309). The description of developing personal epistemologies from absolutist to 
multiplist, and finally to an evaluative stance (Kuhn, 1999) is similar to the pattern of 
cognitive development described by Piaget, or of Kohlberg’s description of the 
course of moral development (Louca et al., 2004). First observed by Perry in his 
(1970) study, the nine stages he identified are more commonly simplified into the 
following four: dualism, multiplicity, relativism and commitment within relativism 
(Hofer & Pintrich, 1997); or to the three stages: absolutist, multiplist, and evaluative 
described by Kuhn (1999).  
Perry’s description of epistemic development remains the most widely 
referenced in the epistemic development branch of the personal epistemologies 
literature. Although he himself never used the term “epistemic development,” the 
developmental scheme that he describes forms the basis of much of the research 
and theoretical pieces published in this field (Buehl & Alexander, 2001; Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997). The scheme itself arose from a study reported in the book Forms of 
Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years: A Scheme (Perry, 1970). The 
qualitative four-year longitudinal study of male students at a prestigious university 
focused on the broader research question of how students respond to the relativism 
that Perry perceived as prevalent in the college environment. The study used 
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interviews conducted at the end of each academic year, and might be described as a 
phenomenological study given the lack of probes and the broad interview question 
that simply asked “what stood out” for them about the academic year. However the 
analysis would perhaps be more accurately described as a grounded theory 
approach, given the large number of participants and volume of data, as well as the 
generation of a new theory about intellectual development that arose from the 
analysis of that data. Although the study was not solely focused on how students 
view knowledge, the developmental scheme that Perry laid out incorporates many 
of the themes that are recognizable as the basis of the current field of personal 
epistemologies including conceptions of structure, nature, source and justification 
of knowledge (Buehl & Alexander, 2001).  
One criticism that has been leveled at the study is the particularly 
homogenous nature of the participants. However, subsequent studies into 
individual epistemic development, including one study using only female 
participants (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986), have found a similar 
developmental trajectory (Baxter Magolda, 1992, 2001; Belenky et al., 1986) in 
different and more heterogeneous samples. As a grounded theory study, the Perry 
study was able to generate a scheme that emerged from the interview data, 
therefore providing strong evidence for the developmental scheme he laid out. 
Although there were clear limitations in the sample, the large amount of data as 
well as subsequent research that indicates a similar developmental trajectory show 
that this was an appropriate methodology, particularly at this point in the 
development of the new theory of epistemic development. 
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One such line of research that has indicated a similar path of development is 
that which has lead to the development of the reflective judgment model (King & 
Kitchener, 1994, 2002). Like the Perry scheme, this was also the result of a series of 
longitudinal studies. The findings are described in the book Developing reflective 
judgment: Understanding and promoting intellectual growth and critical thinking in 
adolescents and adults. However, unlike the Perry study, the King and Kitchener 
study was much more narrowly focused, and rather than focusing on general 
intellectual development, they focused specifically on ill-structured problem 
solving, which they describe as problems about which “reasonable people 
reasonably disagree” (King & Kitchener, 2002, p. 37). Due to this difference in the 
research question, the King and Kitchener study used a much more structured 
interview protocol called the Reflective Judgment Interview (RJI), which asked 
participants to respond to several ill-structured problems. Despite this difference in 
interview protocol, the analysis itself was similar to the grounded theory approach 
used by the Perry team, in that it again generated a developmental scheme from the 
interview data. The King and Kitchener (1994) book reports a series of studies 
based on administrations of the RJI to 1,500 student participants from high-school, 
undergraduate, and graduate populations. The resulting findings as described 
earlier, indicated a developmental model of increasingly sophisticated beliefs about 
the nature of knowledge, however unlike the hard-stage developmental sequence 
described in the Perry scheme, King and Kitchener’s model of reflective judgment 
(King & Kitchener, 1994, 2002) outlines a “soft-stage model” of development. Like 
the Perry study, the King and Kitchener (1994) study was a large-scale interview-
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based study, with a grounded theory approach to analysis. Similarly the resulting 
scheme is well-grounded in the data and provides a good basis for further study of 
epistemic development. 
This depiction of a soft-stage model of development addresses a second 
criticism of Perry’s scheme. As Kuhn (1997) describes, while these types of stage 
theories are useful for describing developmental “guideposts,” they run into 
problems when trying to provide explanation for an individual’s use of a range of 
strategies for knowledge formation at varying levels of sophistication, as well as the 
unevenness with which epistemic schemas are applied (Louca et al., 2004). To 
some extent King and Kitchener’s model of reflective judgment (King & Kitchener, 
1994, 2002) addresses this issue with their “soft-stage model” of development. Their 
developmental model closely reflects the neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral 
development put forward by Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, and Bebeau (2000), and 
depicts stages as overlapping waves. Rather than describing hard shifts from one 
stage to the next, this model describes individuals as employing reasoning schema 
in changing levels of frequency, rather than as moving universally from one stage to 
the next. In this way, although individuals may predominantly use a multiplist 
reasoning schema, depending on the context or support available they may also use 
a more dualist or evaluative approach. This model may go some way toward 
explaining why individuals of all ages can be found to display reasoning at each of 
the stages of epistemic development, as well as the variations in frequency 
according to reasoning domain (Kuhn et al., 2000; Kuhn & Park, 2005). 
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Summary. Despite some criticisms of taking a broad developmental 
approach to personal epistemologies (Hammer & Elby, 2002), there is strong 
evidence that there is a developmental trajectory to individual ways of thinking 
about knowledge and justification (King & Kitchener, 1994, 2002, 2004; Kuhn, 
1999; Kuhn et al., 2000; Perry, 1970). Of the various developmental schemes 
described, King and Kitchener’s reflective judgment model (1994), which 
characterizes developmental stages as overlapping waves rather than hard stages 
(King & Kitchener, 1994, 2002), provides the strongest rationale for why 
individuals of all ages can be found to be using epistemic reasoning at all levels of 
sophistication (Kuhn et al., 2000). Reference to context alongside these soft-stages 
may provide some explanation for findings that indicate both domain differences, 
and generality (Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2006a; Muis et al., 2006). The conception 
of stages as reflecting the frequency of use of reasoning approaches rather than an 
absolute stage, makes this conception of epistemic development particularly 
appropriate for inclusion in the proposed model of epistemic cognition that includes 
contextual influences. 
Though there are clear benefits to the King and Kitchener model of 
epistemic development, little explanation is provided for what the specific 
mechanisms of development are (Louca et al., 2004). Therefore, while this 
description of epistemic development has clear implications in terms of individual 
approaches to information and learning, and should be included in a model as an 
important influence on epistemic cognition, it seems necessary to include other 
components that might explain how development itself occurs. In addition, 
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although the soft-stage model goes some way to explain individual differences in 
approach in varying contexts, the reflective judgment model does not explain what 
type of contextual influences may account for the employment of varying reasoning 
schema in different judgment scenarios. While it is possible that context alone 
influences these differences in schema application, one possibility is that this is also 
related to the individual’s available epistemic strategies within the particular domain 
of reasoning. 
 
Epistemic strategies. Although not a clearly defined branch of the personal 
epistemologies field, using the lens of philosophy, many of the descriptions of 
epistemic beliefs and epistemic development seem to be better thought of as 
epistemic strategies. This includes frameworks characterizing types of reasoning put 
forward by Murphy, Alexander, Green, and Edwards (2007), Royce’s ways of 
knowing (Royce, 1978, 1983), as well as the epistemic resources framework 
described by Hammer and Elby (2002). All of these frameworks: foundationalist, 
coherentist, reliabilist, rationalist, empiricist, as well as the more specific resources 
seem to be best described as strategies or tools that individuals can use to get at 
knowledge. This idea is supported by Richter and Schmid (2010) who describe 
epistemic strategies as a particular type of cognitive learning strategy “aimed at 
validating the knowledge claims raised in expository or informational texts” (p. 49).  
While many of the frameworks for describing different approaches to 
reasoning take the philosophical literature as the foundation for their 
characterizations (Murphy, 2003; Murphy et al., 2007), the use of epistemological 
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theories as foundations for describing underlying individual epistemologies is 
problematic (Hammer & Elby, 2002). Moser (2002) notes that so far none of the 
epistemological theories has stood out as having “maximal effectiveness in getting 
truth and blocking error” (p. 14). Therefore, to try to categorize individuals as being 
foundationalists, reliabilists, or coherentists has questionable validity. Instead, by 
approaching these categorizations rather as representative of a range of epistemic 
strategies that individuals might use to attain knowledge seems both more likely, as 
well as more in line with current philosophical thinking, which describes epistemic 
strategies as having as their “fundamental goal the acquisition of truth and the 
avoidance of error” (p. 14). The following sections therefore examine some of these 
approaches from the personal epistemologies literature that might be thought of as 
belonging to the epistemic strategies component of the broader field.  
Foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and social epistemology. This 
terminology for describing individual epistemic approaches came from a meta-
analysis of conceptual change literature. Drawing from philosophy, Murphy et al 
initially identified “eight principle stances in epistemology” (Murphy et al., 2007, p. 
107): foundationalism, coherentism, direct realism, probabilism, reliabilism, social 
epistemology, and virtue epistemology. Of these eight, they focused their analysis 
on the epistemic stances they found most represented in the conceptual change 
literature, specifically the foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and social 
epistemology frameworks. I will discuss these four frameworks under the current 
section, while a discussion of the links between virtue epistemology and epistemic 
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motivations will be included in the epistemic motivation portion of the current 
chapter.   
The main focus of the Murphy et al (2007, p. 107) chapter was how these 
epistemological frameworks might be used in order to identify the underlying 
epistemologies of conceptual change researchers. However, the authors also discuss 
the potential influence of instructional approaches on students’ conceptual change 
as being somewhat dependent on the students’ own underlying personal 
epistemologies. The foundationalism, reliabilism, coherentism terminology has also 
subsequently been applied to the study of individual teacher epistemic beliefs 
(Hennessey, 2007). 
For the purpose of their analysis, Murphy et al. (2007, p. 107) categorize the 
epistemological frameworks using two dimensions: doxastic vs. non-doxastic, and 
normative (internalist) vs. naturalist (externalist). The doxastic—non-doxastic 
dimension refers to the role that beliefs play in justification. A doxastic 
epistemology is a theory of knowledge that asserts that justification for all 
knowledge rests only on the beliefs that are held, whereas non-doxastic 
epistemologies reject this assertion (Whitman, 1996). Non-doxastic epistemologies 
can therefore be distinguished by the additional forms of justification they permit; 
for example whether they allow purely internal, or also external sources of 
justification (Whitman, 1996). The internalist—externalist dimension here refers to 
whether the theory focuses on internal sources of justification (for example 
cognitive processes in itself) or externalist sources (for example how well cognitive 
processes create valid predictions) (Murphy et al., 2007). In their analysis Murphy 
23 
 
et al. (2007) characterize foundationalism and coherentism as doxastic—normative, 
and reliabilism and social epistemology as non-doxastic—naturalist. This method of 
categorizing epistemologies underscores one of the main issues in moves to apply 
philosophical terminology to psychology – the problem of oversimplification of 
philosophical theories. For example, there are both foundationalist and coherentist 
theories of justification that do allow for some external sources of justification or 
tethers (Fumerton, 2010; for examples see Elgin, 1996; Goodman, 2000). Just as 
many psychological theories of cognition are finely nuanced, so are philosophical 
theories of knowledge and over-simplification of the theories may ignore some of 
the aspects that could make them potentially useful to describe psychological 
constructs or cognitive processes. 
Foundationalism. This “epistemic stance” is characterized by Murphy et al. 
(2007) as holding all knowledge as deriving “through ascent from basic beliefs 
internal to the knower” (p. 107). Sosa (2000), who emphasizes that both knowledge 
and beliefs are specific to a particular time, characterizes the foundationalist 
epistemology as having the structure of a pyramid, whereby “each piece of 
knowledge” (p.135) rests on a foundation of beliefs that are, at that moment, 
undeniable. While there are purely internalist foundationalist theories of 
knowledge, in more modern commentaries these are often referred to as radical 
foundationalism. Increasingly there are examples of contemporary theories of 
knowledge that incorporate external forms of justification while maintaining a 
foundational structure. One example of this is put forward by Fumerton (2010) who 
describes Goldman’s (2000) reliabilist epistemology as an externalist theory of 
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justification that is built on a foundationalist structure. It may be the case that a 
focus on the general structure of knowledge described by foundationalist 
epistemologies, which describes knowledge as building on itself in some way, may 
be a useful concept to apply to the psychological literature. 
Coherentism. Murphy et al. (2007) describe this epistemological framework as 
“that all of one’s beliefs as mutually reinforcing and thereby justified as knowledge 
only in their mutual coherence” (p. 107). Sosa (2000) characterizes coherentism as 
a raft, free floating, unanchored, and although repairs can be made they “must be 
made afloat” (p.136) while standing on some other part of the raft. Again, both 
conceptions may be oversimplified, as there are some epistemologies, such as 
Elgin’s considered judgment (1996), that might be characterized as coherentist with 
regards to the structure of knowledge, but is at the same time externalist in that 
there are tethers to the external world with which the system of beliefs is constantly 
compared. 
Reliabilism. This epistemology is described by Murphy et al. (2007) as “the 
veracity of knowledge based on the cognitive mechanisms’ reliability in producing 
true beliefs” (p. 107). In terms of applicability to psychology, reliabilist approaches 
tend to be the most explicit in their reference to the role of cognitive processes in 
attaining knowledge. Examples of this include Goldman’s previously mentioned 
reliabilist epistemology (2000). Reliabilist epistemologies such as Goldman’s focus 
on, at the most basic level, whether a cognitive process is capable of resulting in 
true beliefs most of the time. As this theory of knowledge focuses on cognitive 
processes this seems like a good fit for a model of epistemic cognition, though it 
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does not provide us with a depiction of which cognitive processes are best suited to 
the task, it may provide some guidance in terms of what epistemic strategies we 
want to encourage through instruction. 
Social epistemology. According to the description given by Murphy et al. 
(2007) social epistemologies focus “on social practices and their influences on one’s 
beliefs about knowledge” (p. 107). In education the “social dimensions of 
knowledge” (Schmitt, 1999, p. 354) are clearly an important area of epistemology 
to acknowledge as by its nature a curriculum often imposes to some extent what the 
“collective knowledge” (Schmitt, 1999, p. 354) of a population is, or at least the 
areas of knowledge that are important and should be given time in schools. 
However, it is not clear how this would fit into a model of epistemic cognition as a 
specific component, though it may be important to recognize the role of a social 
epistemology as the context in which epistemic cognition takes place. 
Summary. While there is some evidence that individuals do use 
foundationalist, coherentist, and reliabilist approaches, and even socially 
constructed norms in order to justify their beliefs (Murphy et al., 2007), in 
individuals these frameworks seem to be better suited to describing strategies rather 
than underlying epistemologies. While individuals may be more inclined to use one 
strategy over another, it seems that these strategies might be taught as various 
methods of constructing knowledge, and in particular as means for evaluating 
existing knowledge, new information, and sources of information. This view is 
supported by the current moves towards instruction in information literacy, and is 
made explicit in the information literacy standards put forward by the American 
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Libraries Association (Association of College and Research Libraries, 2000) and 
reading informational texts standards of the common core curriculum (National 
Governors Association Center for Best Practices, 2010) both of which include 
checking the reliability of information, looking to the source, and checking the 
coherence with other information and existing knowledge all as means of 
evaluating the goodness of information, which cannot be denied as important steps 
in knowledge formation. 
Knowledge-based validation and consistency checking. In their study into the 
influence of epistemological beliefs and epistemic strategies on learning from text, 
Richter and Schmid (2010) introduce the notion of epistemic strategies. These they 
describe as “strategic cognitive activities that take the epistemic status of 
information into account” (p. 49). They then identify two such cognitive activities: 
knowledge-based validation and consistency checking as criteria by which 
individuals may judge information. Under their account, knowledge-based 
validation is described as focusing on “whether the information is true or plausible 
given what [the individuals] already know about a topic” (p. 50); a description that 
seems to be closely linked to the previously discussed foundationalist perspective 
(Murphy et al., 2007). The second criterion consistency checking, is described as 
“whether the information is consistent with and well justified by other information” 
(p. 50); this, similar to the previous knowledge-based validation criterion, seems 
closely linked to another of the perspectives discussed by Murphy et al. (2007), that 
of coherentism. The selection of these two criteria as well as the description of the 
benefits of employing both strategies as potentially leading “to a well organized and 
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tightly integrated knowledge representation” seems to closely align their approach 
with the process of reflective equilibrium described by Elgin (1996). Under Elgin’s 
account internal coherence (consistency checking) is important, the coherent 
system is tethered to the external information by reference to initially tenable 
beliefs, much like the knowledge-based validation strategy.  
The Richter and Schmid (2010) study lends some strong support to the idea 
that these approaches to knowledge formation, previously described in the literature 
as epistemic stances, may be better thought of as epistemic strategies. Unlike 
previous theoretical discussions of epistemological stances or styles, the Richter and 
Schmid approach to cognitive strategies does not attempt to classify individuals, but 
looks at these approaches to knowledge formation as being specifically epistemic 
sorts of cognitive strategy. While the study does provide evidence that the 
employment of epistemic strategies is being strongly influenced by contextual 
factors including area of study, and text genre, the conception of epistemic 
strategies does not preclude the possibility of an individual using multiple strategies 
to attain knowledge. In fact, as previously described, Richter and Schmid argue that 
the use of both strategies together would result in a more coherent knowledge 
representation. 
Ways of knowing. Rationalism, empiricism and metaphorism were 
introduced into the psychology literature by Royce (1978) as “three ways of 
knowing.”  Conceived as “epistemic styles” (p. 153) the three ways of knowing are 
described as psychological patterns that could be used alone or combined by an 
individual, perhaps in a hierarchical order of preference (Muis & Franco, 2010). In 
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other words, an individual might be more likely to use rationalism as a way of 
attaining knowledge but may also use empirical means as a second choice, if it is 
more fitting to the situation. These ways of knowing are termed “basic” by Royce 
as he argues that they have a direct connection to cognitive processes (Muis & 
Franco, 2010; Royce, 1978). The three epistemic styles are described in terms of 
being the particular cognitive processes an individual employs for “getting at” 
knowledge. Rationalism is therefore described as attaining knowledge through 
looking for logical consistency; empiricism as accepting as knowledge that which 
we “perceive correctly” (p. 149); the third “way of knowing”, metaphorism, asserts 
that “knowledge is dependent upon the degree to which symbolic cognitions lead to 
universal rather than idiosyncratic awareness” (p. 149). 
These three ways of knowing may be particularly attractive to personal 
epistemologies researchers as they were specifically identified due to the way in 
which these processes “and the corresponding truth criterion involved are both 
specifiable and primary” (Royce, 1983, p. 167). This means that not only are ways 
of knowing clearly defined and explained as to why they should be included in a 
psychological analysis of epistemology, but also that it is clear what should not be 
included in this analysis and why:  
Such epistemologies as authoritarianism and intuitionism cannot qualify. 
Intuitionism, for example, fails to qualify because it does not have a valid 
truth criterion, whereas authoritarianism fails because both its psychological 
processes and its truth criterion are based on some other (i.e., an authority) 
epistemic approach – i.e., authoritarianism is a derived way of knowing. 
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(Royce, 1983, p. 167) 
Researchers using epistemic styles as a component of their study argue that an 
additional benefit of this approach is that the three ways of knowing are clearly 
linked to observable cognitive processes (Muis & Franco, 2010; Royce, 1978). 
However, the exclusion of epistemologies such as authoritarianism and 
intuitionism may be problematic. While it does seem to be the case that either the 
lack of a valid truth criterion, or a truth criterion based on an external source make 
these excluded epistemic approaches different from the psychological approaches 
allowed by Royce’s scheme, it is not clear that these are not valid or even in some 
cases legitimate epistemic strategies, particularly where, for example, personal 
expertise is low and an appropriate expert or authority figure can be found. In these 
cases, a derived way of knowing may be more adaptive than the high cognitive 
effort required by the primary styles Royce suggests.   
There is evidence that individuals do exhibit these ways of knowing. Most 
recently, Muis and Franco (2010) used a mixed-methods approach to investigate 
the relation of these epistemic profiles to metacognition, problem solving, and 
achievement. In this study of 231 undergraduate educational psychology students, 
Muis and Franco (2010) were able to capture individuals reporting a use of 
rationalism, empiricism, or a combination of rationalism and empiricism as their 
means of attaining knowledge.  In the qualitative portion of the study 78 students 
took part in a problem-solving task that was recorded using a think-aloud protocol. 
Analysis of the data revealed that students who were identified using the Royce 
measure as having a mixed rational and empirical epistemic profile were more 
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likely to use metacognitive strategies and had higher levels of problem solving 
achievement.  These findings indicate that individuals who fit both profiles were 
better at problem solving and may provide some evidence that these “profiles” may 
be better thought of as strategies given the ability of students to use both strategies 
at once as well as the positive influence multiple strategy use had on their problem 
solving ability.  This mixed methods approach lends more validity to the underlying 
construct as well as the instrument used as it is correlated in the expected directions 
with the constructs investigated. 
Epistemic resources. In response to the idea that developmental models reflect 
individuals’ underlying theories or approaches to knowledge, Hammer and Elby 
(2002) put forward the idea of epistemic resources. According to their theoretical 
model, these epistemic resources can be used by an individual to understand several 
different aspects of knowledge including: the “nature and sources of knowledge” (p. 
177), “epistemological activities” (p. 179), “epistemological forms” (p. 180), and 
“epistemic stances” (p. 181). They suggest that individuals of all ages have these 
resources and can understand each of these components of knowledge and knowing 
in several different ways. While they view these epistemic resources as finer grained 
building blocks in the construction of broader epistemic understandings, Hammer 
and Elby (2002) also suggest that shifting towards thinking about “finer-grained 
resources” (p. 183) can help us to think about the sorts of components that go into 
the construction of a more sophisticated epistemology. 
The epistemic resources approach (Hammer & Elby, 2002) is closely aligned 
with the idea of epistemic development, though it describes a much more 
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incremental approach, than the more general stage models. However, it seems that 
a greater distinction between the kinds of strategies or resources an individual uses 
to try to attain knowledge, and their more general beliefs about the nature of 
knowledge is necessary. There is reason to believe that for individuals, a greater 
proficiency with a wider range of epistemic resources might enable overall 
epistemic development, it seems that the number and type of epistemic resources 
available and the ability to apply them should be thought of as separate from the 
developmental schemes, which seem to more closely describe the way individuals 
approach and think about knowledge in more general terms. Due to this 
distinction, Hammer and Elby’s epistemic resources approach to personal 
epistemologies, is incorporated here under the broader umbrella of epistemic 
strategies. 
Summary of epistemic strategies in the literature. While there is support for 
individual use of differing epistemic strategies (Franco et al., 2012; Muis & Franco, 
2010; Murphy et al., 2007; Richter & Schmid, 2010), the conception of epistemic 
resources as being finer grained components of a more general epistemic 
developmental trend has little empirical support (Hammer & Elby, 2002). 
Furthermore, the characterization of epistemic strategies as tools for validating 
knowledge claims (Richter & Schmid, 2010) is so conceptually different to the 
description of epistemic development as attitudes and beliefs about the nature of 
knowledge, that it seems important to maintain separation between epistemic 
development and learning and being able to apply epistemic strategies. The 
importance of maintaining conceptual clarity between development and strategies, 
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as well as the empirical and theoretical support for the influence of epistemic 
strategies on learning provides the rationale for the inclusion of epistemic strategies 
as distinct from epistemic development in a model of epistemic cognition in 
context. 
It seems clear that epistemic strategies and epistemic development do not 
describe the same thing, however, it does seem that there must be a relationship 
between the two, though the nature of this is not clear. As previously described, 
Hammer and Elby (2002) suggest a fine grained approach of specific building 
blocks in four different areas that go into the construction of epistemic 
understandings. This idea of building understandings through acquiring more 
resources, together with empirical evidence that using a mixed strategies approach 
to validate knowledge claims leads to greater use of metacognitive strategies and 
higher levels of problem solving achievement (Muis & Franco, 2010), suggests that 
developing more epistemic strategies may enable overall epistemic development. In terms 
of how epistemic strategies could be learned, the literature on metacognition 
provides some suggestions. Studies into methods for teaching metacognitive skills 
indicate that this might be done through embedding the skills within taught content, 
emphasizing the importance of these skills, and making provisions for continued 
instruction and emphasis on these skills over time (Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, & 
Afflerbach, 2006). If epistemic strategies are learned in a similar way, then this may 
partially explain domain differences. Teaching within the different domains is likely 
to carry implicit and sometimes explicit messages about appropriate ways of 
attaining knowledge within the field (Hofer, 2000, 2006a). Depending on the 
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instruction students have received, they may therefore have more knowledge and 
experience with epistemic strategies in certain fields and therefore their epistemic 
behaviors are likely to be different in different domains. In this way, the mechanism 
of development lacking from the King and Kitchener (1994) reflective judgment 
model, used here for the epistemic development component of the model is explained, 
and cautions that epistemic development is not due solely to maturation (Alexander 
& Sinatra, 2007; Hofer, 2001) are met. 
As has been demonstrated by this portion of the literature review over 
epistemic strategies, this is by no means a clear component of a model of epistemic 
cognition. Several suggestions have been put forward here as comprising epistemic 
strategies including foundationalism, coherentism, direct realism, probabilism, reliabilism, 
social epistemology, and virtue epistemology (Murphy et al., 2007); knowledge-based 
validation and consistency checking (Richter & Schmid, 2010); rationalism, empiricism, 
and metaphorism (Royce, 1978); and knowledge of nature and sources of knowledge, 
epistemological activities, epistemological forms, and epistemic stances (Hammer & Elby, 
2002). This does not even begin to scratch the surface of the full range of 
epistemological theories from the field of philosophy that would be considered by 
Moser (2002) as strategies. However, it does seem that beginning to understand this 
component of the model may shed some light on understanding the mechanisms of 
epistemic development, as well as potential approaches for both improving 
epistemic cognition within specific context and supporting development at the more 
general level. Therefore, the proposed study will use foundationalism, coherentism, 
and reliabilism (Hennessey, 2007; Murphy et al., 2007) for this component of the 
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model in order to “get started” in the investigation, but will also allow for open 
responses to begin a more exploratory investigation of this component and its 
influences. 
 
Epistemic motivations. The third theme that emerged from the personal 
epistemologies literature is that of epistemic motivation. Here epistemic motivation 
is used to indicate motivations that specifically impact the process of belief 
formation (Chinn, Buckland, & Samarapungavan, 2011; Fairweather, 2001). 
Unlike epistemic strategies and epistemic development, which are somewhat 
intertwined in the literature, epistemic motivations tend to be treated as a distinct 
field. In terms of the philosophical roots, this seems to be an area of personal 
epistemologies that may be closely related to virtue epistemology. In philosophy, 
moral virtue theories focus on the virtuous character of the individual, however 
epistemic virtue theories focus specifically on intellectual virtues (Zagzebski, 2000). 
These, Zagzebski explains, are differentiated from moral virtues by the particular 
motivations underlying the behavior, which, in the case of intellectual virtues are 
“based in the motivation for knowledge” (Zagzebski, 2000, p. 458).  
Of the sources reviewed, the only mention of virtue epistemology in the 
psychological literature is by Murphy et al. (2007), who briefly characterize virtue 
epistemology as focusing “on the character of the knower rather than individuals' 
beliefs or collections of beliefs” (2007, p. 107). The lack of focus in the psychology 
literature is particularly surprising given that most models of epistemic development 
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carry a judgment about the type of personal epistemologies that are more 
sophisticated, and by association more valuable (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).  In one of 
the few articles to bridge philosophy and this area of psychology Chinn, Buckland, 
and Samarapungavan (2011) argue that both epistemic virtues and vices ought to be 
included in conceptions of epistemic cognition. The authors suggest two 
components of need for closure: closed-mindedness and discomfort with ambiguity 
(Kruglanski, 1990) as potential candidates for epistemic vice. Based in Lay 
Epistemic Theory (Kruglanski, 1990), need for closure, is described as an 
individual’s “motivational tendency or proclivity” to seek a definite answer 
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996, p. 264). Research findings indicate that individuals 
with a high need for closure show tendencies to seize and freeze on information 
rather than engaging in the hypothesis generation – validation process as an 
ongoing practice (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). A high dispositional need for 
closure may also affect both the way in which an individual processes information 
in trying to find answers to questions (DeBacker & Crowson, 2006) as well as a 
reduction in the amount of information individuals process before committing to a 
conclusion (Kossowska, 2007). These tendencies seem in active opposition to the 
“motivation for knowledge” (p. 458) described as the grounds for epistemic virtue 
by Zagzebski (2000). 
  In another of the rare articles to address epistemic virtue in psychology, 
Lahroodi (2007) discusses the potential of need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982; Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) as a naturally grounded example 
of an epistemic virtue. Lahroodi’s focus on cognitive traits describes those as 
36 
 
epistemically valuable which “stand in a suitable relation to epistemically desirable 
ends such as true belief, knowledge and justification” (2007, p. 228) and notes that 
need for cognition, the motivational tendency to “engage in and enjoy thinking” 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, p. 116) would seem to fit this description.  This argument 
for need for cognition as an epistemic virtue is further strengthened by research 
findings indicating that the trait has an effect on individual enjoyment and 
engagement with arguments; in particular the type of controversial arguments that 
may require high levels cognitive engagement (Kardash & Scholes, 1996; 
Nussbaum & Bendixen, 2003).  
Summary. There is some evidence that both need for closure, and need for 
cognition operate at trait-level as epistemic motivations. This evidence of their 
influence on cognitive engagement (Kardash & Scholes, 1996; Nussbaum & 
Bendixen, 2003) and level and amount of processing (DeBacker & Crowson, 2006; 
Kossowska, 2007) indicates their importance in a model of epistemic cognition, 
together with the strong theoretical rationales for the inclusion of epistemic virtues 
and vices in a model of epistemic cognition, due to the way they orient the 
individual towards epistemic aims (Chinn et al., 2011) indicates an important role 
in a model of individual approaches to knowledge. As well as having a clear 
influence on learning and engagement, epistemic motivations may also influence 
engagement in learning and applying epistemic strategies and therefore possibly 
impact epistemic development. The current study provides an initial investigation 




While several other epistemic virtues and vices have been suggested by both 
psychologists and philosophers, the proposed study will focus on need for closure and 
need for cognition as two different epistemic motivations. Both constructs have evidence 
of operating at trait-level and are well-established approaches to epistemic 
motivations with empirical evidence for their effect on learning. By using both need 
for closure and need for cognition, the proposed study will also seek to capture both 
an epistemic virtue and an epistemic vice.  
 
Domain Generality and Specificity 
Much of the earlier research in epistemic development focused on the 
development of individuals’ general beliefs about knowledge. As the field has 
developed, several studies into the issue of domain specificity-generality have been 
carried out (Buehl & Alexander, 2001; Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000). These 
studies indicate that there are differences in the way individuals express their beliefs 
about knowledge in specific domains, and also that level of expertise and familiarity 
with the epistemic norms of the field seem to be the most important factor in 
predicting the level of development of personal epistemologies (Hofer & Pintrich, 
1997), with more in-depth knowledge of a subject predicting greater sophistication 
of personal epistemologies within that domain. While the idea that there are 
domain differences in expressed personal epistemologies is now widely accepted, 
the way in which these domain specific beliefs relate to one another or to domain 
general beliefs is not clear (Hofer, 2006a).  
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Hofer (2006a) has suggested that the issue may be more a case of how 
domain general beliefs are enacted differently dependent on the particular 
knowledge domain. In other words, personal epistemologies interact with the 
context to give the appearance of domain specific beliefs (Hofer, 2006a). It is this 
idea of the influence of context rather than domain dependence that informs the 
current study. In the proposed model, domain forms part of the more specific 
context that may influence the individual’s approaches to knowledge construction 
via the individual’s knowledge of epistemic norms of the field in which they are 
operating (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997) and the epistemic strategies which are 
appropriate for that field.  
This also supports Hofer’s (2006a) suggestion that education may have a 
greater influence on beliefs about knowledge than simply effects on domain specific 
beliefs. Under this understanding of the domain specificity-generality issue, 
education becomes not only about teaching the epistemological assumptions of a 
certain subject, but also an education in how to evaluate new information; that is, 
“learning how to learn” (p. 73) both within that domain but also, through exposure 
to domain differences in epistemologies, at the domain general level.  
 
Blurring the Lines: Epistemology and Ontology 
Several of the depictions of personal epistemologies described in the literature 
include reference to the nature of reality.  Examples include Kitchener’s (1983) 
description of the epistemic assumption “that there is an objective reality” (p. 226) 
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that may underlie an individuals’ epistemic cognition.  Examples of items on 
instruments that include this notion include: “Scientists can ultimately get to the 
truth” and “If scientists try hard enough, they can find the truth to almost 
anything” that form part of the Schommer’s Epistemological Questionnaire 
(1990b).  However, the concept of reality and the relation of truth to that reality are 
really more ontological questions than epistemological.  This confusion is further 
complicated by items that attempt to capture individual beliefs about knowledge, 
truth, and the nature of reality while using words such as “truth” and “knowledge” 
in the questions themselves.  This is problematic as one individual may respond to 
the question “Scientists can ultimately get to the truth” with a strongly agree, based 
on the belief that scientific “truth” is subjective and negotiated; while another may 
respond in the same manner based on a view of “truth” as reflective of an objective 
reality. The argument is not that an individual’s views about the nature of reality 
and the relation of knowing and truth to reality (however that is defined) do not 
have an impact on how an they might approach knowledge construction or 
acquisition, but that it is important to maintain a separation between the concepts 
in order to not confound personal epistemologies with ontological beliefs.   
A second argument against the introduction of ontological issues into 
conceptualizations of personal epistemologies is the question of whether most 
individuals really spend time reflecting on the nature of reality.  While many 
individuals may have at least thought about what they consider themselves as 
knowing, and the best ways to go about finding and evaluating information to 
achieve knowledge, I question how many individuals have truly reflected on the 
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nature of reality.  If the answer to this question is “not the vast majority”, the 
question of how meaningful these types of items are must be addressed.  If most 
individuals are likely to respond to these types of question on a “gut instinct,” 
responses to these items are unlikely to indicate either a well-formed and articulated 
belief, or anything about their approach to knowledge formation. 
Keeping these issues in mind, care has been taken in selecting instruments 
for this study, in some cases re-wording instrument items to remove words such as 
“truth,” “knowledge,” and “reality” from survey items. This is so that we do not 
confuse the issues, or label an individual with “unsophisticated” personal 
epistemologies, on the basis of an ontological distinction. This is also reflected in 
the proposed analysis of outcomes, standards, and behaviors to focus only on 




Proposed Model of Epistemic Cognition 
 
Figure 1. General model of individual influences on context-driven approaches to 
knowledge formation. 
 
The model of epistemic cognition proposed here is an attempt to bring together 
the three approaches of personal epistemologies described and investigated in the 
current literature into a model that describes the process through which individuals 
form knowledge. The model is not only an effort to integrate the constructs put 
forward by each of the respective branches of the field, but also to make sense of the 
findings with regards to the impact on epistemic behaviors in a knowledge-forming 
context. The model also seeks to make sense of the findings regarding the problem 
of domain specificity and generality by separating individual strategies, 
development, and motivations at the general level from those specific standards and 
behaviors enacted in specific contexts. As throughout the previous review of the 
field of personal epistemology, I have also used the lens of philosophy to try to 
make sense of both the current terminology and findings. 
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The hypothesized model shows the three identified branches of personal 
epistemologies research: epistemic strategies, epistemic development, and epistemic 
motivations as jointly influencing the setting of epistemic standards and, through the 
standards set, the application of epistemic strategies in context. Epistemic standards are 
described as the standards an individual has in a specific context for how much 
processing and information they deem necessary in order to be comfortable forming 
an opinion. Epistemic behavior here describes individual approaches to knowledge 
formation in a specific context, including enacted epistemic strategies, and the 
amount of processing both in terms of time spent and information assessed, before 
coming to a conclusion. This means that effectively epistemic strategies appears twice 
in the model, both at the individual and individual-in-context levels. This reflects 
the idea of epistemic strategies as a specific type of cognitive strategy with 
knowledge formation as the goal (Richter & Schmid, 2010).  
In the proposed model I hypothesize reciprocal effects between all three 
individual components: epistemic strategies, epistemic development and epistemic 
motivation. First I will look at the nature of the relationship between epistemic 
development and epistemic strategies. Although several researchers have discussed 
concepts that I have here categorized as epistemic strategies (Murphy et al., 2007; 
Royce, 1978, 1983) these particular researchers have focused on these as underlying 
personal epistemologies that drive individual approaches to knowledge formation. 
While Richter and Schmid (2010) focus on epistemic strategies as a specific type of 
cognitive strategy, it is Hammer and Elby’s account (2002) of epistemic resources as 
finer grained blocks in the construction of broader epistemic understandings, that 
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most closely relates to the position of epistemic strategies within the proposed 
model. Rather than strategies being a finer grained approach than the broad stages 
of development (Hammer & Elby, 2002) it seems to me that epistemic strategies are 
related to, but not component parts of, epistemic development. I hypothesize that this 
relationship operates in two specific ways. Firstly, learning epistemic strategies, in 
much the same way as learning metacognitive strategies supports metacognitive 
development (Schraw, 1998; Veenman et al., 2006), may support epistemic 
development. Secondly, that the current level of epistemic development may 
influence the types of strategies that an individual seeks out or is taught, as well as 
the fluency in their application. For example, if an individual views knowledge as a 
“coordination of the objective and subjective” (Kuhn et al., 2000) she may be more 
likely to augment a broader range of epistemic strategies in order to construct 
knowledge that fits that description. Similarly, she may also then be more likely to 
use strategies that correspond with this view of knowledge, thereby, through 
practice, enabling their skill in applying them.  
The second hypothesized reciprocal relationship is between epistemic 
development and epistemic motivation. Here I will focus on the two epistemic 
motivations discussed in the literature review: need for closure (Kruglanski, 1990; 
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) and need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). 
Though there is only a low negative correlation (r = -.28) between need for closure 
and need for cognition (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), studies into both of these 
proposed epistemic motivations show relationships with epistemic development. In 
these studies, need for cognition is correlated with more sophisticated views on 
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some dimensions of epistemic development (Kardash & Scholes, 1996), while need 
for closure is correlated with more naive views on dimensions of epistemic 
development (DeBacker & Crowson, 2006). Both need for closure and need for 
cognition are described as dispositions (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et al., 
1996; Kruglanski, 1990; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), given this, it seems 
reasonable to hypothesize that epistemic motivations may impact epistemic 
development through the types of interaction with information and approaches to 
knowledge formation and learning preferred by the individuals. Pintrich, Marx, and 
Boyle (1993) suggest in regards to need for closure, that it may develop over time 
through experience, this supports the hypothesis that epistemic development may 
also influence epistemic motivations through the way the individual views 
knowledge and knowing.  
The third reciprocal relationship hypothesized in the model is between 
epistemic strategies and epistemic motivations. Similar to the proposed relationship 
between epistemic development and epistemic motivations, it is hypothesized that 
epistemic motivation may impact the degree to which the individual is likely to 
learn and develop aptitudes for using epistemic strategies. This hypothesis is 
supported by research findings indicating relationships between need for cognition 
and deep cognitive engagement and use of multiple cognitive strategies (Cacioppo, 
Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986; Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983; Furlong, 1993). 
Similar studies into need for closure show a relationship with more surface learning 
strategies, which due to their nature are more likely to be non-epistemic as these 
strategies do not seek to integrate new information with existing knowledge, and do 
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not foster a deep understanding of the material (Franco et al., 2012). The suggestion 
of an influence of epistemic strategies on epistemic motivation relates to Pintrich et 
al.’s (1993) observation that experience may influence need for closure, a trait that 
they suggest may develop over time. If this were the case, it would seem that 
exposure to and learning new epistemic strategies would be a strong candidate for 
influencing both need for closure, as well as possibly need for cognition, given that 
enjoyment of thinking might be more likely to be greater when the individual has 
more strategies available to them.   
Embedded within the broader umbrella of epistemic behaviors, epistemic 
strategies appears twice in the hypothesized model, both at the individual and 
individual in context levels. This reflects the idea of epistemic strategies as a specific 
type of cognitive strategy with knowledge formation as the goal (Richter & Schmid, 
2010). In this way, enacted epistemic strategies are not in any way proxies for 
underlying personal epistemologies, but represent the epistemic strategies that the 
individual has selected from their “tool box” as appropriate for the knowledge-
seeking task. I hypothesize that the selection of epistemic strategies used in the 
knowledge-forming context is influenced by the demands of the context itself as 
well as the epistemic standards set by this particular individual in the specific 
knowledge-forming context. Research into the domain specificity of personal 
epistemologies indicates that personal epistemologies are expressed differently in 
different domains. Hofer (2006a) has suggested that this is due to domain general 
beliefs being enacted differently and that it is the way that personal epistemologies 
interact with the context that gives the appearance of domain specific beliefs.  
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The hypothesized model is general in the sense that it shows both epistemic 
motivation as well as epistemic behaviors as single entities, whereas in the models 
tested these components will be operationalized as specific factors and constructs. 
The general model also suggests that epistemic strategies, development, and 
motivation together influence epistemic standard setting that mediates the 
relationship between the three components and epistemic behaviors within specific 
contexts. However, it is unclear from the current research and theory how this 
might occur. Contextual factors that may influence epistemic behaviors in 
knowledge-forming contexts might include: perceived personal risks of making the 
wrong decision, interest in the topic itself, as well as prior knowledge of the subject. 
Given the importance of individual perception in some of the contextual factors it is 
conceivable that these factors may mediate the interaction between individual 
epistemic factors and behaviors; however, it may also be the case that these factors 
instead moderate the relationship. Therefore one goal of the proposed study will be 
to test competing models with contextual factors both as mediators and moderators 




Chapter 3: Methodology 
The study uses an online knowledge formation task containing multiple 
texts of opposing positions on the topic of  “Should the use of hand sanitizer be 
promoted in universities?” Participants were given time to select and read as many 
of the pieces as they felt necessary to form an opinion on the topic at which point 
they responded to open-ended reflection questions both about the topic itself, as 
well as their justification processes. Quantitative data about the pages visited and 
Likert-scale items on the contextual factors interest, perceived personal risk, and 
prior knowledge were also collected. This together with the previously described 
qualitative data was used to assess the epistemic standards and epistemic behaviors 
components of the model. The topic of hand sanitizer use was chosen both because 
of students’ acquaintance with hand sanitizer as a product, of which dispensers are 
positioned in numerous places around the campus, but also their likely lack of 
familiarity with the public health issues involved in its usage. The topic is also 
currently fairly contentious with opposing texts easily sourced at multiple levels of 
authoritativeness including scientific literature. Quantitative data on participants’ 
individual levels of epistemic development as well as their epistemic motivations and 
strategies were collected using online survey instruments. 
This mixed method approach enabled investigation of the model as a whole, 
as well as more specific aspects of the hypothesized model. Using a mixed methods 
approach allowed for investigation of aspects of the model that have more defined 
construct definitions such as epistemic development and motivations, as well as those 
that are as yet less well defined such as epistemic strategies. Epistemic development 
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and some epistemic motivations have available instruments, and could therefore be 
quantified. However, epistemic strategies are less well defined, therefore a more 
qualitative approach enabled investigation of these components of the model in a 
more exploratory manner, and also made it possible to assess the appropriateness of 
the hypothesized model as a whole. As the proposed study is cross-sectional the 
reciprocal influences between the proposed individual components of the model 
were not investigated. However, correlations between epistemic motivations, 
development, and strategies were obtained. 
This chapter will first outline my underlying theoretical framework, or 
epistemological beliefs underlying the present study. I will then go on to further 
explain the theoretical rationale for using a mixed method approach and lay out the 
research design. The rest of the chapter describes the participants, materials, 
instruments, and data collection procedures, as well as the data preparation that 
took place prior to the analysis.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
My ontological view is that there is a single external reality. However, I also 
believe the nature of this reality can never be objectively known, and may be very 
different to that which we perceive. Many philosophers have discussed this 
disconnect between our perception and the external reality. This “veil of 
perception” can be described as the gap between perception and reality, and is due 
to the existence of the external reality as independent of our sensation of it. Locke 
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(1979) describes a type of representational realism whereby our perceptions are 
somehow representative of the external reality.  How close these representations are 
to the external reality is not clear and, like many philosophers, I agree that there is 
no objective way of knowing how close these representations are. Due to this 
underlying assumption, in terms of our knowledge of the external reality, I believe 
that the status of the truth condition (under the classical conception of knowledge 
as “justified true belief”) of knowledge can never be ascertained.  Although some 
statements are true with regards to their correspondence to the external reality and 
others are not, I do not think that there will ever be a way of knowing whether the 
truth condition has been satisfied.  This inability to know for certain whether 
something is true or not is due to the previously described disconnect between the 
external reality and our perception of it.   
In terms of knowledge and the knower, I therefore believe that rather than 
knowledge, we can instead only strive for understanding, through making sense of 
the perceived connections between assertions, and justified beliefs.  What I suggest 
for justification and understanding is a type of internal coherentism and external 
reliabilism similar to that suggested by Elgin (1996). Under her description of 
Considered Judgment, justification is gained through reflecting on whether a 
proposition has initial tenability with regards to the coherence with the individual’s 
overall system of beliefs.  While I believe that Elgin’s conception of considered 
judgment has some problems with regards to the agency of the individual in making 
those judgments about a proposition’s initial tenability and subsequent 
incorporation in their greater system of beliefs, I do think this idea of initial 
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tenability could be expanded to include standards for justification that would 
recognize individual cognitive capabilities.  In this way, judgments about the 
plausibility of an assertion could be made with reference to multiple sources of both 
internal and external evidence in the form of both perceptions of reality as well as 
prior beliefs.  This addition of standards for justification may provide us with a 
stronger rationale for believing that may get us somewhat closer to an accurate 
reflection of the external reality.  However, this description of considered judgment 
does mean that what constitutes justified beliefs is highly subjective and highly 
dependent upon both individual’s perceptions of reality and their pre-existing 
schema.   
This epistemological and ontological viewpoint has led me to position 
myself as a critical pragmatist (Crotty, 1998) in terms of my underlying 
assumptions about the nature of reality and also of inquiry. Like James (1981) I am 
interested in conducting inquiry and interpreting the results in terms of the 
“respective practical consequences” (p. 26).  This epistemological standpoint is in 
line with the epistemological framework at the root of mixed method inquiry where 
methods are selected based on their usefulness as tools in answering the research 
questions (Schutz, Chambless, & DeCuir, 2004). 
 
Rationale and Evidence for a Mixed Method Approach 
The main rationales for employing a mixed-method approach for the study 
were to investigate the process and for completeness in describing and investigating the 
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model (Bryman, 2006, p. 106). The study sought to investigate the hypothesized 
model of epistemic cognition as a potential explanation for the interaction of 
domain-general epistemic strategies, development, and motivation and their 
combined influence on epistemic standards and behaviors in a knowledge-forming 
context. Given that the study sought not only to ascertain the relationships between 
components, but also to understand the underlying mechanisms through which the 
components may influence standard setting and strategy selection, a mixed-
methods approach was deemed necessary.  
The argument for the necessity of a mixed-methods approach is best 
approached by looking at the research questions individually. The first set of 
research questions focused on the relationships between the proposed components 
of the model: 
1. How are domain-general epistemic strategies, development, and motivations 
related to the epistemic standards set and epistemic behaviors displayed in a 
specific knowledge-forming context? 
a. Do epistemic motivations act as a mediator between epistemic development, 
strategies and the standards set in a knowledge-forming context? 
b. Which of the proposed epistemic motivations: need for closure or need for 
cognition has the greatest impact on epistemic standard setting and 
epistemic behaviors displayed in a knowledge-forming context? 
c. Which of the proposed contextual influences (i.e., interest, perceived 
personal risk, importance of understanding, and prior knowledge) has the 
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greatest impact on epistemic standard setting and epistemic behaviors in a 
knowledge-forming context? 
The focus of these questions on relationships, and specifically sub-questions on 
possible mediation effects of motivations, and the level of impact of contextual 
influences and epistemic motivations clearly required a primarily quantitative 
approach. However, epistemic behaviors and the nature of the relationship between 
standards and behaviors could not be captured purely quantitatively. Therefore in 
order to address the broader question of the nature of the relationships between 
context independent epistemic components and context dependent components 
necessitated the incorporation of a qualitative approach. In other words, 
quantitative methods alone would not have been adequate to look more closely at 
the process behind the relationships or provide completeness in the descriptions of the 
influences of the various components in the model. In other words, quantitative 
analysis would not have been able to fully investigate the processes involved or to 
provide a “comprehensive account” (Bryman, 2006, p. 106) of epistemic cognition. 
On the other hand, while qualitative analyses enabled an analysis of the processes 
and participant thinking in terms of their selection of strategies and means of 
justification in the knowledge-forming context, they cannot investigate the nature of 
the relationships in terms of mediation or magnitude of effects.  
The second and third questions both focused on epistemic behaviors within 
the knowledge-forming context: 




3. How is the repertoire of domain-general epistemic strategies and the epistemic 
strategies enacted in a knowledge-forming context related? 
a. What epistemic strategies emerge in a knowledge-forming context? 
b. Of the epistemic strategies that emerge in a knowledge forming context, 
which of these are captured by the epistemic strategy instrument? 
While quantitative data covering some aspects of epistemic standards and behaviors 
were collected, not all aspects of epistemic behaviors are quantifiable. One primary 
example of this is epistemic strategies, as there is no single instrument that captures 
all of the epistemic strategies proposed in the literature review. The instrument used 
was therefore unlikely to capture all possible strategies exhibited by students during 
the task. Due to this limitation, the study only collected quantitative data on 
epistemic strategies at the domain general level and did not ask participants to 
repeat an epistemic strategies instrument for their strategy use in the knowledge-
forming context. Instead of a quantitative measure, qualitative questions about 
strategies participants used during the knowledge-forming context were necessary 
for completeness. Participant open-ended responses to questions about the strategies 
used to select materials in addition to their general responses to the topic prompt 
were analyzed inductively for specific strategies employed during the task and 
compared with their quantitative responses. A final consideration was that the 
qualitative data collected on epistemic strategies employed in context led to greater 
understanding of the construct with potential applications for further instrument 
development, another of the mixing rationales found by Bryman (2006). 
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The use of mixed methods for this study was also better aligned with my 
own pragmatist epistemological framework than a single method approach, and 
was hoped to be more successful in capturing the multi-layered nature of the 
assumed external reality. By using a combination of methodological approaches the 
potential for understanding “different aspects of the phenomena under study” 
(Schutz, Nichols, & Rodgers, 2008, p. 278) was increased. Schutz et al’s description 
of ontology as that of a richly layered and complex reality, with an epistemology of 
never quite knowing whether we had attained “the truth” aligns closely with my 
own and provides a strong rationale for utilizing multiple approaches to try to make 
sense of phenomena from multiple angles and lenses. 
 
Research Design 
The study employed concurrent implementation (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 
2007), meaning that the qualitative and quantitative data were collected at the same 
time as each other. The task-based data collection resulted in both quantitative and 
qualitative data; while the remaining survey instruments resulted only in 
quantitative data. The sequence of the surveys and online search task were 
determined by priming considerations, with the surveys given following the 
problem solving task so as not to cue participants into the focus of the study, and in 
particular the types of strategies they might have used in the knowledge forming 
task to approach the information provided. 
In terms of the dominance, different approaches were used to study each set 
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of research questions. For the first group of research questions, an embedded 
correlational design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007) was used. This is a quantitative 
dominant approach with a focus on the correlations, in this case the path models. 
Qualitative data were used to investigate the underlying processes. Interpretation 
was therefore primarily quantitatively driven, with qualitative descriptions. For this 
set of research questions:  
1. How are domain-general epistemic strategies, development, and motivations 
related to the epistemic standards set and epistemic behaviors displayed in a 
specific knowledge-forming context? 
a. Do epistemic motivations act as a mediator between epistemic development, 
strategies and the standards set in a knowledge-forming context? 
b. Which of the proposed epistemic motivations: need for closure or need for 
cognition has the greatest impact on epistemic standard setting and 
epistemic behaviors displayed in a knowledge-forming context? 
c. Which of the proposed contextual influences (i.e., interest, perceived 
personal risk, importance of understanding, and prior knowledge) has the 
greatest impact on epistemic standard setting and epistemic behaviors in a 
knowledge-forming context? 
the quantitative data were used to investigate correlations between the individual 
epistemic strategies, development and motivations, and the epistemic standards and 
behaviors employed during the task. Qualitative data were used to investigate the 
underlying processes behind any correlations found, particularly those relating to 
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the epistemic behaviors displayed in the knowledge-forming context.  
The second research question focused heavily on the epistemic behaviors: 
2. How are epistemic standards set, and epistemic behaviors displayed in a 
knowledge-forming context related? 
Due to the limitations of the epistemic strategies instrument, dominance for this 
question will again take an embedded correlational approach. Correlations between 
the quantitative data on individuals’ epistemic standards for the task, and data from 
the internet logs on the number of pages visited and amount of time spent were 
analyzed. Qualitative data from student reflections and descriptions of strategies 
employed while reading and reflecting on the information were used to investigate 
the processes. These were then compared with the data from the quantitative 
instrument in order to illuminate similarities and differences between strategies 
captured by the instrument and those that the participants themselves described 
using during the task. 
The third set of research questions was investigated using a more 
exploratory design  (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007): 
3. How is the repertoire of domain-general epistemic strategies and the epistemic 
strategies enacted in a knowledge-forming context related? 
a. What epistemic strategies emerge in a knowledge-forming context? 
b. Of the epistemic strategies that emerge in a knowledge forming context, 
which of these are captured by the epistemic strategy instrument? 
c. In order to answer these questions, comparisons between the quantitative and 
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qualitative data were made in order to more deeply understand the 
phenomenon under study.  
The implementation and dominance described above may be illustrated by the 
following figure. The illustration shows the task-based components including 
context on the right, and the individual components on the left as in the original 
proposed model (Figure 2). Variables that were investigated quantitatively are 
shown as white boxes. Epistemic behaviors and standards, which were investigated 
with both quantitative and qualitative data, are shown as a shaded box to indicate 
the inclusion of qualitative data. The relationship between individual epistemic 
strategies and those that emerged as part of the epistemic behaviors in context were 
investigated purely qualitatively, and are therefore indicated in the figure by dashed 
connectors. This inclusion in the figure of epistemic behaviors as being investigated 
both qualitatively and quantitatively indicates the embedded aspect of the 
embedded correlational design used to address questions one and two; while the 
dotted line between individual epistemic strategies and task-based epistemic 
behaviors indicates the more exploratory approach to the third question. As this 
study employed cross-sectional data collection, the relationships between epistemic 
strategies, development, and motivations were investigated through correlations. 
However, correlations between these components provide some support for 
conducting a longitudinal cross-lagged investigation of the reciprocal influences 




Figure 2. Illustration of the study design implementation and dominance. 
 
Participants 
The participants for this study were undergraduate and graduate students 
enrolled in philosophy and education classes at a large state University in the 
Southwest United States. There was a total of 84 participants, 13.10% of which 
were male, and 86.90% were female. The ages of the participants were between 18 
and 41 (M = 21.04, SD = 3.13). Of the participants, 85.70% identified as White, 
2.40% as African American, 2.40% as American Indian, 1.20% as Hispanic, 3.60% 
as Asian, 1.20% as Pacific Islander, 3.60% identified as mixed-ethnicity (2.40% 
identified as Hispanic and White, and 1.20% as Native American and White). The 
total number of semesters in college reported by participants was between 2 and 18 
(M = 5.57, SD = 2.71). The GPA of participants was between 2.75 and 4.0 (M = 





Search task topic. Hand sanitizer is commonly seen on college campuses 
and public spaces and is therefore a product that most students are aware of. 
However, the use of hand sanitizer remains scientifically controversial with the 
CDC going back and forth on its recommendations for hand sanitizer use (Boyce & 
Pittet, 2002; Hall et al., 2011) but, in contrast with some other scientifically 
controversial topics such as the HPV vaccine (Hilpert, Brem, Carrion, & Husman, 
In Press) the use of hand sanitizer is not morally controversial, nor is it a topic that 
seems to be closely tied to political or religious affiliation such as global warming 
(Bråten & Strømsø, 2010; Bråten, Strømsø, & Samuelstuen, 2008; Strømsø, Bråten, 
& Samuelstuen, 2008) or evolution (Sinatra, Southerland, McConaughy, & 
Demastes, 2003). Although the other topics are good at obtaining participant 
engagement, underlying moral beliefs seem to moderate the relationship between 
the epistemic factors studied and the behaviors and resulting opinions from 
participant encounters with the instruction or text (Hilpert et al., In Press).  
A second reason for selecting hand sanitizer as the basis for the online task 
was the availability of Internet resources of varying quality on both sides of the 
argument, including both pro and con hand sanitizer use articles from authoritative 
sources. The use of controversial, argumentative, and dual-positioned texts is a 
commonly used approach to investigating the role of epistemic beliefs in processing 
of information (for examples see: Bråten et al., 2008; Kardash & Howell, 2000; 
Mason, Boldrin, & Ariasi, 2010). The main benefit of this approach for this study 
was that the articles were restricted allowing for easy coding of the materials 
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accessed by the participants. This approach also ensured that all participants had 
access to the same articles regardless of their Internet search abilities, as the study 
was intended to look at individual uses of available information rather than their 
ability to search and find information on the Internet.  
Search task environment. In order to find Internet resources on the topic of 
hand sanitizer Google searches were conducted using the search terms “hand 
sanitizer,” “hand sanitizer dangers,” “hand sanitizer benefits,” “hand sanitizer 
pros,” and “hand sanitizer cons” the search results were investigated and the text 
from 16 different pages at various levels of authority were copied and pasted into 
Word files. Although several peer reviewed journal articles were found on the topic 
of hand sanitizer, these were rejected for the purposes of this study due to length 
and the amount of subject specific terminology. The researcher sorted the 16 
articles into different levels of authority using the trustworthiness and expertise 
dimensions described by information science (Danielson, 2006). According to this 
framework trustworthiness encompasses ideas such as accuracy of information and 
lack of bias, while expertise includes concepts such as the ability of the source to 
provide accurate and valid information (Danielson, 2006). Word counts, Flesch-
Kinkaid Reading Ease, and Flesch Grade Level equivalents were then obtained for 
the main text contained on the Web pages. Subsequently four pairs of articles 
emerged has having equivalent authority, approximately equivalent word counts, 
and levels of reading difficulty. For the purposes of maintaining equivalency of 
word count and reading difficulty across pro and con sets, as well as keeping each 
text more cleanly on one side of the argument some content was cut from the 
61 
 
Infection Control Today article “CDC’s endorsement of alcohol hand rubs 
launches in hand hygiene” (Dix, 2002) and the term “nosocomial transmission” 
was translated to “hospital-acquired infection” to improve readability and 
comprehension. A summary of the word count and readability scores for each text 
and means for both pro and con groups can be viewed in Tables 1 and 2. 
Web pages at the fourth and highest level of authority were, therefore, those 
that referenced empirical peer reviewed articles but showed a lack of bias. Both 
articles at this level were from the website infectioncontroltoday.com (Dix, 2002; 
Vogel, 2011), a healthcare focused publication that provides summaries of research 
and studies, as well as reports and guidelines from public health agencies and 
professional organizations. At the first and lowest level of authority were pages 
from thisispublichealthusf.blogspot.com  “Hand Sanitizer: Killing Germs on the 
Go!” (Nunzio, 2011) and www.whiteowlconspiracy.com “Think hand sanitizers 
protect you against germs? Think again…” (WhiteOwlConspiracy.com, 2010). 
Both were low on trustworthiness and expertise with the “This is public health” 
blog referencing no external sources, and the “White Owl Conspiracy” article 
showing clear signs of bias in the language used as well as the approach of the 
website as a whole. At the second level of authority, the Livestrong.com articles 
(Hampton, 2011; Hanes, 2011) were also low on expertise due to a lack of accuracy 
in reporting as well as a lack of reference to external sources for their claims. While 
at the third level the article from the Washingtonpost.com (Cohn, 2011) was higher 
on trustworthiness and expertise due to the reference to and description of an 
empirical study, however there was some detail missing due to the style of reporting 
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and potentially the expertise of the reporter in this subject area. The second third-
level article was from LiveScience.com (LiveScience Staff, 2010) and showed 
higher levels of trustworthiness and expertise, and described an empirical study in 
detail. However, it is noted in the article that one of the researchers of the study 
reported in the article was employed by a hand sanitizer manufacturer, which raises 

















290 52.1 10.7 
2 http://www.livestrong.com/article/86149-
advantages-alcohol-hand-sanitizer/ 
333 35.9 12.0 
3 http://www.livescience.com/11138-hand-
sanitizer-work-number-sick-days.html 




1067 51.5 10.7 
 Total Words 2072 - - 
 Readability Scores M - 42.2 11.4 
Notes: * indicates that words were cut and some wording changed to improve readability 
and equivalency of word count. See description of materials for further details. 
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318 37.6 12.0 
2 http://www.livestrong.com/article/101880-
risks-hand-sanitizers/ 








771 14.2 12.0 
 Total Words 2023 - - 




Following the selection of Internet resources used for the information use 
task, replica web pages were created. Due to the closed nature of the search task for 
analysis purposes, it was important that none of the resources linked out to the 
wider Internet; therefore, all links were removed from text and images in the final 
web pages available to participants. In order to present the information in a realistic 
environment a web page identical to a Google search results page was created with 
links to each of the pages above a brief portion of the text from each linked resource 
and date posted. To counteract any possible effect of the top hit being perceived as 
most relevant, two versions of the Google search results pages were produced with 
differently sequenced results. The first version displayed the LiveScience.com pro 
hand sanitizer article “Hand Sanitizer at Work May Lower the Number of Sick 
Days...” as the top hit, while the second version showed the anti-hand sanitizer 
article “Think hand sanitizers protect you against germs? Think again...” from the 
whiteowlconspiracy.com site first in the list of results. Both the web pages and both 
versions of the Google results pages are available in Appendix C. 
 
Instruments 
Pre-task survey. The pre-task survey focused on four of the contextual 
factors from the model. There were three questions for epistemic standards (e.g., It is 
important that I understand the issues of this topic before forming an opinion), 
interest (e.g., I think this is an interesting topic), and personal risk (e.g., Making the 
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wrong decision on this issue could impact me negatively). Perception of prior 
knowledge was addressed by the single item: “I have already encountered a great 
deal of information on this subject.” All contextual factor questions were measured 
using 7-point Likert scales, with 1 being strongly disagree, 4 neutral, and 7 strongly 
agree.  A final question asked for participants’ existing opinion on the topic “Indicate 
the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement “OU should be 
purchasing and promoting the use of hand sanitizer on campus.” This question was 
also measured using a 7-point Likert scale (see Appendix B for the full instrument). 
Epistemic behaviors. Quantitative information from the task came from the 
Internet log files. The Internet log files provided numerical data on the number of 
pages accessed, the amount of time spent on each page visited, information about 
which specific pages were visited. Due to the structure of the information presented, 
log file data also provided the level of authority of each of the pages accessed and 
the number of pages on each side of the issue accessed. The sequence in which the 
pages were visited was also provided.  
Post-task survey. The post-task survey began with a fourth Likert-type 
epistemic standards question, which aimed to capture how confident individuals felt 
in their decision: “I feel I have read enough information to form an opinion on the 
subject.” Participants noted their agreement using the same 1-7 scale described 
previously. The remainder of the post-task survey focused on their thoughts on the 
issue after reading the information and how they reached the decision. These were 
assessed using mainly open-ended questions as well as one quantitative question 
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which asked participants to rate the helpfulness of the available sources (see 
Appendix D). 
Epistemic motivations. Two different traits were measured for the epistemic 
motivations component of the hypothesized model: Need for Closure (Kruglanski, 
1999; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) and Need for 
Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et al., 1996). Although other 
epistemic motivations have been suggested including dogmatism, open-
mindedness, and intellectual curiosity among many others (Chinn et al., 2011) the 
current study focuses on need for closure and need for cognition as two traits that 
are already well established in the personal epistemologies literature and which also 
capture both an epistemic virtue and vice.  
Attitudes, Beliefs and Experiences Scale. Need for closure will be measured using 
a 16 Likert-item short-form of the Attitudes, Beliefs, and Experiences scale (ABE) 
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). This version comprises only the following two 
subscales: discomfort with ambiguity and closed-mindedness. Only these two 
subscales are used as they most clearly impede "the attainment of an epistemic aim" 
(Chinn et al., 2011, p. 158). Cronbach alpha’s for each scale range from high .60s to 
low .80s for discomfort with ambiguity, and .61 for closed-mindedness (Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994). Items include: “In most social conflicts, I can easily see which 
side is right and which is wrong” (discomfort with ambiguity) and “I do not usually 
consult many different opinions before forming my own view” (closed-
mindedness). (See Appendix E for full instrument). 
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Need for Cognition Scale. Need for cognition was measured using the short form 
18 Likert-item Need for Cognition Scale (NCS) (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). 
The 18 item scale is highly correlated with the original 34 item scale (r = .95, p < 
.001) and has high internal consistency (α = .90) (Cacioppo et al., 1996). Items 
include: “I would prefer complex to simple problems” and “I would prefer a task 
that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but 
does not require much thought.” (See Appendix F for full instrument). 
Adapted Epistemic Beliefs Scale. Due to a lack of empirical investigation 
into the nature and variety of epistemic strategies and instrument to capture the full 
range of possible strategies, only three of the proposed epistemic strategies were be 
measured: foundationalism, coherentism, and reliabilism. The 30 Likert-item 
Epistemic Belief Scale (Hennessey, 2007) was originally designed to capture teacher 
epistemic beliefs about approaches to teaching science. For a sample of pre-service 
teachers the instrument has reported Cronbach’s alphas from .67 to .81 for the 
foundationalist items, from .82 to .89 for coherentist items, and from .77 to .87 for 
reliabilist items. The instrument has also been adapted to assess student beliefs 
about appropriate teaching practices for biology and educational psychology 
(Hennessey, in preparation). For the purposes of the proposed study, the original 
instrument was used as the basis for new items re-written to focus on individual 
approaches to learning about a new topic. Example items include foundationalism: 
“I think about how new information builds on what I already understand,” 
coherentism: “I look for explanations that show how new information is related to 
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numerous concepts,” and reliabilism: “I reflect on whether my thinking aligns with 
the available evidence.” (For full instrument see Appendix G).  
Reasoning about Current Issues Test. Epistemic development was 
measured using the Reflection on Current Issues Test (RCI) (Wood, Kitchener, & 
Jensen, 2002). The instrument is comprised of three ill-structured problems 
accompanied by 10 statements about justification that map on to different levels of 
reasoning in the Reflective Judgment Model (King, 2000; King & Kitchener, 1994) 
(see Appendix H for a sample problem). As previously discussed, the Reflective 
Judgment Model is a soft-stage model, therefore the use of three ill-structured 
problems is intended to indicate the predominant stage of the participant. In 
keeping with this perspective, the authors of the instrument warn that the stage 
given by participants’ scores can only indicate functional reasoning ability, rather 
than optimal level (King & Kitchener, 2004). However, as the proposed study looks 
at epistemic cognition as a process by which individuals construct justified beliefs 
and the individual factors that influence that process, functional rather than optimal 
reasoning ability is more relevant to the proposed model. Participants are asked to 
rate how similar each of the statements are to their own thinking using Likert-scale 
responses. Participants are then asked to rank the top three statements that most 
resemble their thinking, this ranking is used to assign a score of 2-7, which 
corresponds to the stage on the Reflective Judgment Model. Included in the 
responses is the option to mark an item as meaningless, meaningless statements are 
present for each ill-structured problem and participants are made aware of this, 
which may result in some higher level approaches to reasoning being indicated as 
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meaningless, and some meaningless items being treated as meaningful. These 
meaningless items act as a control and help refine the scoring of the instrument. 
Cronbach’s alphas for the RCI range from low to mid .70s (King & Kitchener, 
2004). (See Appendix H for sample item). 
Procedures 
The experimental task was administered to groups of up to 15 at a time and 
data were collected at single session using Firefox web browser on both PC and 
Mac laptops. Prior to data collection the researcher installed Sqlite Manager, a 
Firefox add-on onto each computer, set the Firefox preferences to “Remember 
History,” and hid the URL from the navigation toolbar. Following data collection 
from the first group, it became apparent that the log files did not record pages 
arrived at via the back button, meaning that the return to Google and the end time 
points page visits were not recorded. For subsequent data collection sessions a new 
version of the web pages was created with dummy back buttons that were links to 
the Google page. DisableBackspaceNavigation 0.6 (Fuchlocher, 2011), a Firefox 
add-on was subsequently also installed as part of the set-up process to prevent 
participants using keystrokes to return to the Google page, thus circumventing the 
links. 
On entering the data collection location, participants were assigned a 
participant ID number. This number was in the survey and also in the file name for 
the log file data and was used to link the survey responses and downloaded Internet 
log file data. Surveys were administered using SurveyMonkey, a web-based survey 
solution. This eliminated the need for data input from pencil and paper surveys, 
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and also allowed for integration with the online search task including random 
assignment of the Google search page version A or B (see Appendix C). They were 
first asked to provide demographic information (see Appendix A) and then 
introduced to the task with the prompt “Should OU spend any of its budget on 
purchasing and promoting the use of hand sanitizer on campus?” Students were 
then asked to respond to the pre-task survey (see Appendix B). 
Following the pre-task survey items participants were given the following 
instructions: 
Thinking about the question "Should OU spend any of its budget on 
purchasing and promoting hand sanitizer on campus?" look at the 
information available on the following web page. You may look at and use 
as much or as little of the information as you like. Use the links and browser 
"back button" to navigate. When you have finished browsing and reading 
the information close the tab to return to this survey.  
Participants were then shown a link to the information, which was presented in a 
Google-type web page with eight “search results” on the topic of hand sanitizer. 
SurveyMonkey randomly assigned the version of Google available to each 
participant, 49% of participants had access to version A, and 51% to version B. The 
online format was used due to both the prevalence of the use of online information 
in problem solving, as well as ease of using Internet log files to collection data about 
the number and name of sources accessed, the amount of time spent on each page, 
as well as the sequence in which the sources were accessed.  
Once participants finished reading as much or as little of the information as 
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they felt was necessary to answer the question prompt, they were asked to complete 
a second Likert-type epistemic standards question on whether they saw the amount 
of information they read as sufficient. Following this, participants responded to the 
following prompt with a short essay: “What is your opinion on the use of hand 
sanitizer in university settings?” as well as open-ended survey items about how they 
reached the decision, including how they decided which pages to look at, and how 
they made decisions about how valuable the information provided was. (See 
Appendix D) 
Following the collection of task related data, participants were presented 
with quantitative surveys aimed at capturing epistemic motivations (need for 
closure and need for cognition), epistemic strategies, and epistemic development at 
the individual level. The epistemic development instrument, the Reasoning about 
Current Issues Test (RCI) is a copyrighted assessment tool and is administered by 
Reflective Judgment Model researchers, therefore this instrument was completed 
on an external website (http://www.reflectivejudgment.org) which participants 
accessed via a link on the final page of the SurveyMonkey surveys. Although the 
model depicts epistemic components at the individual level as influencing those at 
the task specific level, the sequence of data collection with these components 
collected after the task was selected to avoid any possible prompting about the 
nature of the study. As the individual components epistemic motivations, strategies, 
and development have been shown to operate at trait level, the sequence of data 
collection is not seen as a threat to the validity of the study. 
Once participants had completed the final survey, the researcher used Sqlite 
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manager, a FireFox add-on to open the sqlite.places database and the following 
syntax from forensicswiki.org (2011) to pull the URLs visited and time data 
together into a single table: 
 
SELECT datetime(moz_historyvisits.visit_date/1000000,'unixepoch', 
'localtime'), moz_places.url, moz_places.title, moz_places.visit_count 
FROM moz_places, moz_historyvisits  
WHERE moz_places.id = moz_historyvisits.place_id  (Forensics Wiki, 
2011) 
Tables were then exported as .csv files and saved to a password protected USB 
drive under the participant ID number. Csv file data were later merged into a single 
xls file using Microsoft Excel for analysis. 
 
Data Preparation: Quantitative 
Following each data collection session, data from the individual Internet log 
files saved at the data collection were analyzed and time spent at each of the 
resources accessed were calculated for each participant by subtracting the time the 
source was accessed from the subsequent return to the emulated Google page. 
These data were copied into a single Excel file, which included the version of the 
Google search page the participant had access to, the web pages visited, the 
sequence they were visited in, and the time spent at each web page. Due to 
unforeseen difficulties with the Internet logging data on the amount of time spent at 
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each page were only accurate for 66 of the 84 participants. These 18 missing data 
included the initial ten participants prior to the addition of a dummy back button, 
as well as the four participants who used backspace navigation before the 
DisableBackspaceNavigation (Fuchlocher, 2011) was instituted as part of the data 
collection procedure. A further four participants did not follow the instructions to 
return to Google at the conclusion of their search so the duration recorded for the 
time spent at the final page visited was inaccurate. 
At the conclusion of all data collection sessions an aggregate score of time 
spent, combined with the level of authority, was created (VisitScore) for the 66 
participants with complete time information by assigning four points to the most 
authoritative source, three for sources at the third level of authority, two for the 
second level, and one for the least authoritative and multiplying the points assigned 
to each source by the amount of time spent on the page: ∑(time spent x level of 
authority). A balance score was also created to reflect epistemic behaviors. This was 
calculated by subtracting the number of con pages visited from the number of pro 
pages visited. As the focus was on balance between pages visited rather than the 
particular viewpoint the individual focused on, the valance of the score was then 
removed. The scores were reverse coded so that a score of 4 reflected the greatest 
level of balance between pro and con articles, and scores of 1 the least. Participants 
who visited no pages were assigned a value of 0. 
At the conclusion of all data collection sessions the survey data were 
downloaded from SurveyMonkey, were sorted by participant ID number and saved 
as a new file. Open responses from the post-task survey as well as the item asking 
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participants to note the sources they visited were then removed from this resaved 
version of the data. Many of the participants failed to note “did not read” for the 
question “Which sources did you think were the most helpful?” Zeros (the value 
assigned to the response “did not read”) were therefore entered for sources with no 
participant responses so that the analyses would not be affected by list-wise or 
pairwise deletion. The two scores described above VisitScore, and Balance, as well 
as the sites visited were copied into the data file. Data were then imported into 
SPSS and the “recode into same variable” function was used to reverse code items 
in the Need for Cognition Scale (items 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 16, and 17) and the 
Attitudes, Beliefs, and Experiences Scales (items 1, 8, 9, 12, and 14).  
Adapted Epistemic Belief Scale. PRELIS (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006) was used to 
assess univariate normality epistemic strategy items from the AEBS. After assessing 
that the item distributions did not significantly differ from the normal curve a CFA 
was conducted LISREL (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006). Although comparative model 
fit indicated acceptable model fit (CFI=.97), the goodness of fit index (GFI=.65) 
indicated that the model was a poor fit. Additionally, there were very high 
correlations between the three factors. Between the latent variables coherence and 
foundationalism the correlation was .99, between coherence and empiricism .87, 
and between foundationalism and empiricism .84. This indicates that the items 
lacked discriminant validity and may have been measuring the same latent trait 
(Kline, 2011). Therefore, given the lack of theoretical rationale for adjusting the 
factor structure, it was decided to conduct an EFA using SPSS to investigate the 
factor structure empirically. A principal components approach was used, with no 
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rotation and the SPSS default eigenvalue cut-off of 1. Kline (1994) suggests that 
using the SPSS default eigenvalue of 1 as the cut-off for factors typically produces 
too many factors, with later factors explaining little additional variance. In this case 
although SPSS produced a five-factor solution, the scree-plot indicated either a two 
or one factor solution, as there was a sharp change in slope at the second factor (See 
Figure 3). Kline suggests that the point at which the line of the scree plot changes 
slope is a good indication of the number of factors which should be rotated (Kline, 




Figure 3. Scree plot showing eigenvalues for each component of the Adapted 
Epistemic Beliefs Scale.  
 
A second EFA was therefore run, this time using varimax rotation and 
specifying a two-factor solution. According to Kline (1994) varimax rotation is a 
good method when an orthogonal simple structure is desired. For the purposes of 
instrument development simple structure is desirable as they are both replicable and 
simple to interpret. The single factor solution explained 52.82% of the variance, 
while the rotated two-factor solution explained 59.08%, with factor 1 explaining 
35.98% and factor 2 explaining 23.10% of the variance. Item loadings for the two 
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factor solution were then inspected and seemed to fall into two theoretically distinct 
epistemic strategies: looking for connections between new and existing 
understandings (internalist) and reference to evidence (externalist). Items that 
loaded within .15 of each other on both factors were eliminated (items 6, 8, 13, 12, 
and 24). Scale reliabilities were obtained for each scale, and means scores created. 
Analysis of the scale reliability for internalist indicated a Cronbach’s alpha of .96 for 
16 items.  Analysis of the scale reliability for externalist indicated a Cronbach’s alpha 
of .87 for 7 items. Composite scores for each scale were created by computing the 





Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis of the Adapted Epistemic Belief Scale with 
Varimax Rotation 
Scale internalist externalist 
22. I look for explanations of the topic that build on basic understandings .81 .24 
25. I examine the links between concepts .81 .33 
5. I think about how new information builds on what I already 
understand 
.78 .23 
28. I look for examples that show how concepts are related .77 .29 
19. I reflect on how new information connects with my existing 
understandings 
.77 .42 
20  I think about whether information is consistent with what I already 
understand 
.75 .38 
12. I think about whether examples reinforce my basic understanding .75 .27 
26. I look for information that shows how concepts are related .74 .43 
16. I think about how new information could be explained using 
information that everyone already understands 
.73 .26 
11. I think about whether new information aligns with my current 
understanding 
.73 .20 
2. I make connections between the topic and other concepts I already 
understand 
.72 .35 
3. I look for examples that make sense given my current understanding .67 .37 
30. I try to see what conclusions about the topic I would arrive at given 
my existing understandings. 
.66 .31 
29. I begin building my understanding of a topic by looking at the 
underlying ideas. 
.63 .41 
1. I look at the links between as many concepts as possible .62 .34 
15. I look for explanations that show how new information is related to 
numerous concepts 
.60 .44 
24.* I reflect on the evidence for my thinking .59 .53 
21.* I justify my understandings by looking at the available evidence .56 .53 
14. I focus on understanding a few core concepts .51 .09 
8.* I relate my understanding of new information to my direct 
observations 
.45 .43 
10. I make judgments based on whether or not explanations are based on 
observable evidence 
.08 .73 
18. I inform my understandings by looking for more evidence .33 .73 
27. I make sure that my reasoning is based on evidence .30 .72 
9. I focus on information that is based on evidence rather than opinion .26 .71 
23. I check my conclusions by referring to evidence  .39 .70 
17. I reflect on whether the conclusion would be evident to everyone .10 .64 
7.  I look for examples that provide observable evidence .39 .62 
4. I look for examples that show how reasoning can be confirmed by 
evidence 
.40 .60 
13.* I reflect on whether my thinking aligns with the available evidence .51 .57 
6.* I verify new information by looking at more evidence .52 .55 
Note. Items adapted from the Epistemic Belief Scale (Hennessey, 2007).Factor loadings > .40 are in 




Attitudes, Beliefs, and Experiences Scale. A CFA was also conducted on 
the Attitudes, Beliefs, and Experiences scale (ABES). The chi square minimum fit 
function indicated a statistically significant result, which in the case of model test 
statistics represents a failure to reject the null hypothesis that the model implied 
covariance matrix is a good fit to that of the data (Kline, 2011). Therefore an EFA 
was conducted, this time although the Scree plot indicated a three-factor solution, 
the component items suggested by the loadings resulting from a varimax rotation 
and requesting a three-factor solution could not be theoretically justified. Therefore 
a third EFA was conducted requesting a two-factor solution. The resulting loadings 
indicated items loading on the expected factor with the exception of items 5 and 3, 
which loaded on both factors, and items 12, 10, and 11, which had loadings of 
lower than .4 (see Table 4).  Items 5 and 3, which loaded on both factors, were 
assigned to the expected closed mindedness factor, this raised the internal reliability 
from .66 with neither, to .73 when both were included. Internal reliability for six 
items on the discomfort with ambiguity scale was .73. Composite scores for each scale 




Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis With Varimax Rotation of Need for Closure 
Items 
Scale ambiguity closed 
6. When I am confused about an important issue, I feel very 
upset. .78 -.11 
13.  I feel uncomfortable when someone's meaning or intention is 
unclear to me. .69 .09 
4.  I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why 
an event occurred in my life. .67 .24 
2.  I don't like situations that are uncertain. .60 .25 
15.  I'd rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty.
  .48 .00 
7.  In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is right 
and which is wrong. .46 -.01 
5.  I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone 
else in a group believes. .46 .44 
12* I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are very 
different from my own. .40 .21 
10* I like to know what people are thinking all the time. .39 -.28 
11* It's annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make 
up his or her mind. .37 .24 
9.  When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different 
opinions on the issue as possible.  .12 .70 
14. I always see many possible solutions to problems I face. -.19 .69 
1. Even after I've made up my mind about something, I am 
always eager to consider a different opinion. .28 .64 
8. When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see 
how both sides could be right. .05 .55 
16. I do not usually consult many different opinions before 
forming my own view. .04 .55 
3. I dislike questions which could be answered in many 
different ways. .42 .47 
Note. Factor loadings > .40 are in boldface. Items 5 and 3 were both assigned to the closed mindedness 
factor. *indicates items eliminated from the final scales. 
 
Internal reliability coefficients were then obtained for the pre-task 3-item 
scales for interest, personal risk, and importance of understanding, as well as the 
Need for Cognition Scale. There was no indication that removing any of the items 
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would significantly raise the internal reliabilities of these scales therefore composite 
scores computed by calculating the mean across all items for each scale. Descriptive 
statistics including reliability coefficients for scale scores are available in Table 7. Of 
the 66 participants whose data are included in the quantitative analyses of the 
model two participants did not answer the question asking whether they felt they 
had sufficient information on the topic to form an opinion, and one did not answer 
the question about the amount of prior knowledge they had on the question. Given 
the already reduced number of participants, and the small amount of missing data, 
mean imputation was deemed an appropriate approach in order to avoid loss of 
data resulting from listwise deletion in the path models (Kline, 2011).  
Results from the Reasoning about Current Issues Test were received from the 
Reflective Judgment Model researchers and the mean score derived from the three 
scenarios was incorporated into the quantitative data. Composite scores and single-
item scores, which included prior knowledge, initial opinion, as well as task-based 
epistemic behavior scores VisitScore and Balance, were then screened for univariate 
normality in PRELIS (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006). The screening indicated that 
skewness and kurtosis for Perception of Personal Risk, Prior Knowledge, Initial 
Opinion, Information Sufficiency, VisitScore, Balance, and the RCI and 
Discomfort with Ambiguity composite scores violated the assumption of normality 
(see Table 5), therefore these scores underwent normal transformation in PRELIS 




PRELIS Tests of Skewness and Kurtosis Significance Values 
  Skewness  Kurtosis  Skewness and Kurtosis 
Variable  Z-Score P-Value  Z-Score P-Value  Chi-Square P-Value 
Perceived Risk   0.71 .48  -2.54 .01  6.96 .03 
Prior Knowledge   2.23 .03  -1.23 .22  6.50 .04 
Initial Opinion   -3.34 .00  2.10 .04  15.58 .00 
Visit Score   4.02 .00  1.76 .08  19.24 .00 
Balance   -4.60 .00  2.52 .01  27.47 .00 
Sufficiency of 
Information  
 -4.34 .00  3.43 .00  30.55 .00 
RCI   -2.41 .02  1.72 .09  8.79 .01 
Discomfort 
w/ambiguity 
 -2.20 .03  1.12 .27  6.08 .05 
 
Table 6 
PRELIS Tests of Skewness and Kurtosis Significance Values Following Normal Score 
Transformation 
  Skewness  Kurtosis  Skewness and Kurtosis 
Variable  Z-Score P-Value  Z-Score P-Value  Chi-Square P-Value 
Perceived Risk   0.06 .95  -0.40 .69  0.16 .92 
Prior Knowledge   0.66 .51  -0.82 .41  1.10 .58 
Initial Opinion   -0.48 .63  -0.68 .50  0.68 .71 
Visit Score   0.34 .73  -0.46 .64  0.33 .85 
Balance   -1.22 .22  -2.09 .04  5.86 .05 
Sufficiency of 
Information  
 -0.41 .68  0.08 .93  0.18 .92 
RCI   0.00 1.00  0.13 .89  0.02 .99 
Discomfort 
w/ambiguity 
 0.01 .99  0.12 .91  0.01 .99 
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Data Preparation: Qualitative 
Following each data collection session survey responses were downloaded 
from SurveyMonkey. Responses to the following open and closed response items 
were copied into an individual text file for each participant along with the questions 
themselves to provide structure: 
> Do you think that OU should be purchasing and promoting the use of hand 
sanitizer on campus?  
> I feel I have read enough information to form an opinion on the subject 
> Having looked at some of the available information, what is your opinion on 
whether the use of hand sanitizer should be promoted in universities? 
> Do you think your opinion could change in the future? 
> Sources chosen: 
> thisispublichealthusf.blogspot.com: Hand Sanitizer: Killing Germs on the 
Go! 
> www.whiteowlconspiracy.com: Think hand sanitizers protect you against 
germs? Think again... 
> www.livestrong.com: Risks Of Hand Sanitizers  
> www.livestrong.com: Advantages Of Alcohol Hand Sanitizer 
> www.washingtonpost.com: Handing out diplomas with a side of a clean - 
The Washington Post 




> www.infectioncontroltoday.com: Researchers Study Hand Sanitizers and 
Norovirus Risk 
> www.infectioncontroltoday.com: CDC's Endorsement of Alcohol Hand 
Rubs Launches New Era in Hand Hygiene 
> Why did you choose those sources? 
> Helpful Sources 
> Why did you find these the most helpful? 
 
The information was then saved as .txt files under the participant ID number to 
allow for easy reference and creation of file sets based on the quantitative analysis. 
Files were then imported into TAMS Analyzer (Text Analysis Markup 
System) for analysis (Weinstein, 2012). TAMS Analyzer is an open source 
computer program designed to help researchers code, recode, and group codes into 
broader themes in documents using text tagging. The program can then be used to 
analyze codes including providing code frequency counts and graphics based on the 
data and relationships between codes. Given the relatively large number of 
individual qualitative responses TAMS Analyzer was selected as an appropriate 
method of storing and organizing the text-based data. Given the features of the 
program, which allow for the creation of sets within the imported files, TAMS 
Analyzer was also seen as an ideal method for creating sets based on responses to 
quantitative items and being able to compare common themes emerging from the 
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data within each set as well as making comparisons between sets. 
In addition to downloading the data, creating individual files for 
participants, and importing the data files following each data collection session, an 
additional file was also created for memoing the data analysis process. Memoing is 
an integral part of the qualitative analysis process and for this study formed an 
important part of both the analysis, write-up and peer debriefing process (Creswell, 
2007; Ezzy, 2002; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Memoing, in addition to allowing the 
researcher to note emerging thoughts about connection between themes, also 
enhances the auditability (Miles & Huberman, 1994) of the research and lays open 
the phases of analysis for peer review (Ezzy, 2002). Memoing can take many forms. 
My own memos contain both an overview of the steps taken during the analysis 
process, but also my emerging thoughts about how codes may be grouped into 
themes, and how these may be related, as well as initial thoughts on how the data 
related to the research questions. Although memoing is possible within TAMS 
Analyzer, I opted to conduct my memoing separately in a Word document in order 
to both reduce my dependence on TAMS Analyzer, as well as to allow my own 
thinking about the connections between codes and themes to be free of the 
constraints of the program itself and my own expertise in its use (Ezzy, 2002). 
Inductive analysis of the qualitative data also began following the first data 
collection session. This began by classifying (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) the different 
components of the data. These classifications were largely determined by responses 
to specific questions in the survey. However, some participant responses to 
questions fit better in other classifications than would have otherwise been 
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determined by the question it was responding to alone.  
The second step in the analysis was abstracting (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) 
from the data. For this I used “in vivo codes” with the labels based on the words of 
the respondents themselves. Whereas Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest an 
approach based on seeing how the data fits to an existing theoretical framework, I 
decided to use a more grounded theory approach as described by Strauss and 
Corbin (1998). This allows for the codes and themes to emerge from the data and 
was seen as a more appropriate approach to the data as the theoretical framework 
for the strategy components in particular is not yet established. Therefore trying to 
make the data fit a theoretical framework would have been impossible. In vivo 
coding was conducted on the open responses until the coding reached saturation. 
Throughout this in vivo coding process memoing continued focusing largely on the 
possible links between the in vivo codes and on possible categories to emerge from 
them. 
Following in vivo coding of the first 20 participants the importance of 
including access sequence from the Internet logfiles was realized so a ninth 
classification “Source Sequence” was added to the text files along with the 
sequence information and version of the Google simulation was available to the 
participant. After analyzing data from 40 participants saturation seemed to have 
been reached. Saturation is the point at which no new information seems to be 
emerging from the coding process (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), and at this stage, there 
were over 400 “in vivo” codes (a negative side effect of the ease with which 
qualitative software enables the user to create new codes) many of which were very 
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similar in the wording of the “in vivo” code and equivalent in meaning. The 
process of examining these codes and condensing them into more specific codes 
that captured the meaning of the participants’ own words began. A list was 
generated of all of the codes generated so far and the search and recode functions 
were used to examine codes within the participant responses and check for 
correspondence of meaning between participants. Similar chunks of text were 
recoded using a more uniform coding system. This resulted in 237 codes across the 
eight open response questions and logfile data, which includes 67 codes to describe 
access sequence, and source preference, which were used for analysis of access 
patterns of participants falling into different groups based on the quantitative data. 
Through this recoding process the following categories were constructed: forms of 
justification, openness to change, source selection rationale, and source helpfulness rationale. 
Although these largely fell along lines of the classifications described above there 
was a lot of overlap in the way that individuals talked about the justification for 
their opinions, the sources they used and why they used them across all four open 
response questions. 
Axial coding was then conducted (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) in order to find 
relations between codes and categories to sub-categories by looking at the properties 
of the ways that the participants wrote about their opinion forming process through 
the four questions. Sub-categories are able to explain more than categories as they 
breakdown the concept into greater detail, but also illuminate connections between 
the more fine-grained codes (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). These sub-categories 
emerged following the initial distilling of “in vivo” codes into codes, and used the 
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same functions of TAMS Analyzer to search for codes within the text and re-read 
sections of coded text within their original context to look for meanings and 
connections. The recode function then allowed for the addition of subcategories to 
the original codes in order to allow the connections between codes emerge within 
their broader categories. Due to the brief nature of many of the participant 
responses a full, grounded theory approach was not possible. However, results of 
the axial coding as well as comparisons between logfile data, quantitative 
responses, and the qualitative data are presented in the findings section. 
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Chapter 4: Findings 
The current study was conducted with the aim of empirically investigating 
the relationship between the three approaches to personal epistemologies and 
positioning them within a model of epistemic cognition. Quantitative data was 
collected both at the general level and within an online knowledge-forming task. 
These data were then used to investigate how domain general epistemic strategies, 
development, and motivations were related to the epistemic standards set and the 
behaviors displayed in an online knowledge forming setting. This included 
investigation into the potential role of epistemic motivations as mediators between 
epistemic development and strategies and the epistemic behaviors exhibited in the 
specific context, as well as the relative influence of each of the proposed epistemic 
motivations and contextual factors on information approach behaviors. 
Quantitative data were also used in combination with the qualitative data collected 
in order to look at the relationship between standards and behaviors in a 
knowledge-forming context.  
 
Quantitative Findings 
Descriptive statistics. Prior to composite score construction as described in 
the methodology section, the Cronbach alphas for all composite study variables 
were computed. These together with the descriptive statistics for both the epistemic 





Descriptive Statistics for Epistemic and Task Variables 
     Range   
Variable n M SD α Potential Actual Skewness Kurtosis 
Pre-task         
Interest 66 4.35 1.45 .98 1 – 7 1.00 – 7.00 -0.47 -0.10 
Risk* 66 3.44 1.35 .85 (1 – 7) .75 – 6.29 0.18 -0.29 
Understanding 66 4.95 1.21 .87 1 – 7 2.00 – 7.00 -0.30 -0.30 
Prior Knowledge* 66 3.00 1.58  (1 – 7) .64 – 7.09 0.19 -0.58 
Initial Opinion* 66 1.12 1.39  (1 – 7) -1.92 – 3.22 -0.14 -0.41 
Task         
Information 
Sufficiency* 
66 5.41 1.02  (1 – 7) 2.72 – 7.25 -0.12 -0.07 
VisitScore* 66 418.10 431.01   -328.19 – 1507.56 0.10 -0.32 
Balance* 66 2.93 1.22  (0 – 4) .63 – 4.30 -0.35 -0.83 
Epistemic Strategies         
Internalism 66 4.86 0.97 .96 1 – 7 2.65 – 7.00 -0.07 -0.46 
Externalism* 66 4.56 0.87 .87 (1 – 7) 2.33 – 6.67 -0.16 0.04 
Epistemic 
Development 
        
RCI* 66 4.70 0.78 .63 (2 – 7) 2.76 – 6.65 0.00 -0.04 
Epistemic 
Motivations 
        
Discomfort 
w/Ambiguity* 
66 4.84 0.86 .73 (1 – 7) 2.67 – 7.00 0.00 -0.05 
Closed 
Mindedness 
66 3.30 0.84 .73 1 - 7 1.29 – 4.86 -0.28 -0.43 
Need for 
Cognition 
66 4.44 1.02 .93 1 – 7 1.61 – 6.72 -0.12 0.37 
Notes: Items indicated with a * show the descriptive statistics for the variable after normal score 




Cronbach’s alphas were deemed acceptable for scale variables, with the 
lower reliability for the Reasoning about Current Issues Questionnaire (RCI) 
variable reflective of the small number of items and particular structure of the 
instrument. The RCI instrument consists of three scenarios to which participants 
respond by rating reasoning approaches in terms of how similar they are to their 
own thinking, and then ranking these approaches. However, because each scenario 
results in a single score the internal reliability is calculated on the basis of only three 
scores. Additionally, the RCI instrument and the theory on which it is based 
reflects a soft stage model, therefore it is consistent with the theory and proposed 
model that participants would respond differently depending on the content and 
context of the different scenarios, as it is the functional level of reflective judgment 
that is assessed by the instrument as an average across topics.  
Correlations between variables. A correlation matrix was then obtained in 
order to investigate the relationships between epistemic strategy, development, and 
motivations as well as their relationships to the task variables (see Table 6). The 
variable Semester, to indicate the total number of semesters in college, was also 
included in the correlation matrix as this has been indicated in the literature as 
related to the level of epistemic development (Perry, 1970). The correlation matrix 
indicated that there were significant correlations in the expected directions between 
the epistemic strategy dimensions: internalist and externalist, the epistemic motivations: 
discomfort with ambiguity and need for cognition, and VisitScore. While, 
surprisingly, the level of balance in website selection was not significantly 
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correlated with any of the epistemic variables, it was related to the number of 
semesters of college attended and the VisitScore. Both of the epistemic strategies 
correlated significantly with a feeling of having sufficient information following the 
search task to justify their opinion. Information sufficiency was also related to 
interest in the topic. Although the RCI, the variable intended to capture epistemic 
development, was not correlated with any of the task variables, it was positively 
correlated with the both the internalist epistemic strategy dimension and the 
epistemic motivation need for cognition, and negatively correlated with closed 
mindedness. The high correlation between internalist and externalist epistemic 
strategies indicates that, despite the indications of the EFA, that the two scales may 
be indicative of a single latent trait rather than two different epistemic strategy 
approaches. 
Given the relationships indicated by the correlation matrix, a series of 
regressions was performed in order to address research question 1. As the main 
outcome variable for mediation and regression analyses was VisitScore, the 18 
participants who did not have accurate visit time data due to problems with Internet 
logging were eliminated from the quantitative analyses. Therefore, mediation and 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Regression Analyses. Due to the small sample size and the large number of 
potential variables in the model, a series of regressions analyses was conducted in 
order to answer the research questions rather than constructing a larger path model. 
Research question 1(b) asked: Which of the proposed epistemic motivations, need 
for closure or need for cognition, has the greatest impact on epistemic standard 
setting and epistemic behaviors displayed in a knowledge-forming context? A 
multiple regression was conducted in SPSS in order to investigate the extent to 
which each of the variables discomfort with ambiguity, closed mindedness, and need for 
cognition predicted VisitScore. Variables were entered into the analysis 
simultaneously; the results are shown in Table 9. 
The results indicated that closed mindedness did not significantly predict 
VisitScore. A separate regression analysis was conducted with discomfort with 
ambiguity and need for cognition, which together predicted 17.9%  (p < .05) of the 
variance, with discomfort with ambiguity negatively related to VisitScore (β = -.27, 
p < .01) and need for cognition positively related (β = .27, p < .05). In answer to 
question 1(b) need for cognition and discomfort with ambiguity appear to account 




Regression coefficients of epistemic motivations on VisitScore 
    95% CI for B 
 B S.E. β Lower Upper 
Discomfort with Ambiguity -141.00 59.76 -.28* -260.447 -21.55 
Closed Mindedness 28.46 70.61 .06 -112.69 169.60 
Need for Cognition 125.619 57.83 .30* 10.01 241.23 
Notes: R2 = .18 (p < .01), * p < .05 
 
Question 1(a) asks whether the relationships between epistemic development 
and strategies and the epistemic standards enacted during the task are mediated by 
epistemic motivations. Baron and Kenny (1986) lay out four steps for testing 
mediation. These are test that: (1) the initial variable predicts the dependent 
variable, (2) the initial variable predicts variations in the proposed mediator, (3) the 
proposed mediator predicts variations in the dependent variable, (4) when 
controlling for the mediator, the effect of the initial variable on the dependent 
variable is zero. It has subsequently been argued that not all four steps are necessary 
(Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998). This is because the path from the initial variable 
to the dependent variable can be implied if steps 2 and 3 are met, and that step 4 
only applies in the case of complete mediation, which is unlikely in the social 
sciences (Kenny et al., 1998). As the previous analysis of the comparative 
influences of the epistemic motivation variables on VisitScore indicates that only 
discomfort and need for cognition predict significant variations in the dependent 
variable, only these two variables were used as mediators in the regression analyses 
carried out to address this question.  
Three multiple-mediation models were tested using INDIRECT (Preacher & 
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Hayes, 2008) a macro for SPSS. This macro allows the researcher to test multiple 
mediator models using both the Sobel test and bootstrapping. In addition to the 
total, direct, and indirect effects, INDIRECT is also able to assess the comparative 
significance of individual indirect effects using bootstrapping to provide confidence 
intervals. This method eliminates the need to conduct separate regressions of the 
independent variable on the mediators and dependent variable. The three models 
tested therefore were (1) epistemic development, the epistemic strategies (2) 
internalist, and (3) externalist, each with discomfort with ambiguity and need for 
cognition as mediators, and VisitScore as the dependent variable. The number of 
number of bootstrap samples recommended has increased as computing power has 
increased (Preacher & Hayes, 2008), therefore 5,000 bootstrap samples were 
requested to provide bias corrected and accelerated (BCa) CIs of 95% for each of 




Mediation of the Effect of Epistemic Development and Strategies on VisitScore Through 
Discomfort with Ambiguity, and Need for Cognition 
 Sobel Tests  Bootstrapping 
 Product of Coefficients  BCa 95% CI 
 
Point 
Estimate SE Z  Lower Upper 
(1) Epistemic Development       
 Indirect effects 
Discomfort w/Ambiguity 11.81 19.37 0.61  -15.92 58.92 
NFCog 36.55 24.03 1.52  1.51 114.53 
TOTAL 48.36 32.43 1.49  -0.01 135.54 
 Contrasts 
Ambig. vs. NFC -24.74 29.25 -.85  -96.94 29.85 
(2) Internalist       
 Indirect effects 
Discomfort w/Ambiguity -.93 17.53 0.43  -58.76 39.83 
NFCog 22.40 46.06 0.49  -84.73 127.33 
TOTAL 21.47 49.70 0.43  -109.72 142.09 
 Contrasts 
Ambig. vs. NFC -23.33 48.86 -.48  -120.16 88.90 
(3) Externalist       
 Indirect effects 
Discomfort w/Ambiguity -15.26 19.55 -0.78  -83.32 32.82 
NFCog 43.07 30.95 1.39  -17.99 145.34 
TOTAL 27.81 39.46 0.70  -73.59 145.83 
 Contrasts 
Ambig. vs. NFC -58.33 33.46 -1.74  -139.09 12.48 
 
The bootstrap results indicate that only the relationship of epistemic development 
(as indicated by the RCI) and VisitScore is mediated by one of the proposed 
epistemic motivations: need for cognition. However, the bootstrap contrast between 
discomfort with ambiguity and need for cognition indicates that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the indirect effect when the RCI variable 
is mediated by discomfort with ambiguity and the indirect effect when the variable 
is mediated by need for cognition. Additionally the Sobel test for the relationship 
between development and VisitScore mediated by need for cognition indicates non-
98 
 
significance (absolute scores of Z > 1.96 are significant at p < .05). Although the 
Sobel test is known to be very conservative, this result taken together with the 
contrast of the mediated effects through discomfort with ambiguity and need for 
cognition, indicate a need for caution when interpreting the 95% confidence 
interval for the indirect effect of development through need for cognition on 
VisitScore. 
In order to further investigate the influence of the individual epistemic 
factors on epistemic standard setting and behaviors a step-wise regression was 
performed of all of the components: development, strategies, and motivations on 
Information Sufficiency. Information Sufficiency was used as a second proxy for 
standards in addition to VisitScore, which captured the actual amount and type of 
information the participants accessed. The results of the regression analysis 
indicated that use of externalist epistemic strategies  (β = .47, t(64) = 4.87, p < .01) 
was the strongest predictor of perceptions of information sufficiency. All other 
variables were excluded. Externalist epistemic strategies explained 22% of the 
variance in Information Sufficiency Perceptions, R2 = .22, F(1, 64) = 17.81, p < .01. 
A second step-wise procedure was conducted from the three epistemic components 
on balance, which represented the extent to which the articles were balanced or one 
sided. None of the individual level variables emerged as predictors. 
 Question 1(c) focused on the contextual influences (interest, perceived 
personal risk, importance of understanding, and prior knowledge) on epistemic 
standard setting and epistemic behaviors. In order to assess the impact of these four 
contextual factors on epistemic standard setting and behaviors, a step-wise 
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regression was performed with all four contextual influences on VisitScore, balance, 
and Information Sufficiency. None of the variables emerged as significant 
predictors of VisitScore or Balance. However, both interest, β = .41, t(64) = 3.32, p < 
.01 and risk, β = -.32, t(64) = -2.63, p < .001 emerged as predictors of Information 
Sufficiency. Together, interest and risk accounted for 17.5% of the variance, R2 = 
.18, F(1, 64) = 6.90, p < .05. 
Mixed-Method Findings 
Following the creation of composite scores, the 84 participants in the study 
were sorted from highest to lowest on the six epistemic development, motivation, 
and strategy variables. Individuals with the 10 highest scores, and 10 lowest scores 
on each variable were selected for further qualitative analysis. Due to the overlap 
between participants’ scores across the six variables, the selection process resulted 
in a total of 60 participants whose responses were used in the subsequent analyses. 
The open response short essays were analyzed “blind” without reference to their 
scores on the variables. File sets based on scores were only created after the open 
coding process was complete in order to prevent the possibility of bias in coding by 
the researcher on the basis of expected responses. Axial coding was then conducted 
with reference to participants’ scores on the variables in order to look for patterns 
among similar participants. Due to the large amount of data, this was conducted 
using the search function of TAMS Analyzer. TAMS Analyzer allows the 
researcher to search for a specific code set and generate reports based on that code 
and organized by another variable encoded in the data. For the purposes of the 
present analysis the coded portions of the data were organized into columns 
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representing each of the twelve high-low groups on the six variables. These also 
linked back to the original documents so that codes could be analyzed both 
individually and in context. 
As previously described, the coding process resulted in four broad categories 
largely embedded in the open response questions themselves. These were: forms of 
justification, openness to change, source selection rationale, and source helpfulness rationale. 
Within each of these categories were several sub-categories, which I will describe in 
the following sections beginning with forms of justification. Throughout the 
following description of the mixed method findings the high/low group on the each 
of the six variables that the participant quoted belongs to are reported in 
parentheses. Where the participant belongs to more than one group all groups are 
reported. 
 
Forms of Justification. There were three main approaches to justification 
used by participants. These were: providing evidence, asserting beliefs, and 
expressing preferences. Within each of these broad categories were several sub-
categories that appeared in the data. 
Evidence. Several sub-categories emerged as common forms of evidence 
given by participants in support of their opinions. These were: personal experiences: “I 
have even seen recently that people will put a large bottle of hand sanitizer next to 
sinks which encourages people to actually use that because it is readily available 
and faster” (development – low), information from the online sources:  
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as an article I read stated, the use of hand sanitizers in work places and 
public environments have minimized the number of sick days that people 
are taking and the amount of coughing, flu and other viruses that circulate 
around work places (discomfort with ambiguity and closed mindedness – 
high) 
prior knowledge: “I can't help but think about stuff I have heard about hand sanitizer 
and the affects on your hands. For example, I have heard that if hand sanitizer is 
used too much then it will dry out your hands and make them a bit rough” 
(discomfort with ambiguity – low), and example situations: “I think this mostly 
because of publicly shared areas like for example; computer labs, door handles, or 
classroom desks etc” (discomfort with ambiguity – low).  
There seemed to be very little difference in comparing participants at the 
high and low ends of any of the epistemic motivation, development, or strategy 
variables in terms of their general frequency of evidence use. However, participants 
high in internalist and externalist strategies and need for cognition, and low in 
closed mindedness and discomfort with ambiguity, did offer more evidence based 
on the specific sources provided than their counterparts. Individuals low in 
discomfort with ambiguity and closed mindedness also offered more examples of 
specific situations where hand sanitizer might be useful than those high on those 
measures. 
Asserting beliefs. The sub-category of asserting beliefs emerged as statements 
that were not explicitly tied either to the available resources, prior knowledge, 
experiences, or to specific examples. Several types of beliefs emerged that formed 
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part of the participants’ statements in support of their opinions following the search 
task. These were: beliefs about cleanliness and hygiene: “Since college students are 
always so busy and in a rush, hand sanitizer is a great way to promote clean hands 
which will lead to healthier students and faculty” (closed mindedness – high), 
convenience: “Yes, it does not kill as many germs as soap and water, but the 
convenience of it is great and it is better to use something than nothing at all” 
(closed mindedness, discomfort with ambiguity, and development – high), germs 
and the spread of germs and their relation to health and illness: “Germs spread so 
quickly and easily” (closed mindedness and discomfort with ambiguity – high), the 
general effectiveness of sanitizer: “Considering that it is easier, more tie [sic] efficient, 
and more likely to kill bacteria it seems that hand sanitizer is an easy choice over 
soap” (closed mindedness – low, development and need for cognition – high), 
implementation: “Hand sanitizer would also be something that would be easy to 
install in college campuses. It could easily be put in places such as gyms, 
bathrooms, classrooms, and hallways” (internalist strategies and development – 
low), financial aspects of promoting and purchasing sanitizer: 
I think, OU should wait until there is a consensus on the topic before 
investing any large amount into the promotion of hand sanitizers. Students 
and taxpayers would be very upset if they knew their university was 
spending money on hand sanitizer and then it turned out it was not effective 
(closed mindedness – high, development – low) 
; the role of universities in health promotion: “I also believe that it is not the job of a 
university to promote the use of hand sanitizer, it should be an individuals choice” 
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(development – high), and beliefs about other people including other’s perceptions and 
knowledge of sanitizer, their ability to use sanitizer responsibly, and their laziness 
in hand hygiene: “I believe that people often use hand sanitizer as a replacement for 
hand washing, which I would think that wouldn't be as affective” (discomfort with 
ambiguity – low). Across beliefs as a broad category there were no clear differences 
in the frequencies that beliefs were asserted as a form of justification between high 
and low scores on the epistemic variables.  
Expressing Preferences. These were assertions that were neither beliefs nor 
evidence, but purely statements of preference without reference to any evidence or 
reasoning for the preference. These included preferences both about the use of hand 
sanitizer, as well as the type of promotion that should be employed by the university. 
There was a marked difference in the use of this approach for justification across 
participants scoring high and low on these variables. Across epistemic 
development, strategy, and motivation variables, the preferences as justification 
approach was used far more by individuals who were high on closed mindedness: 
“I personally am a fan of this product and use it every change [sic] I can get” (closed 
mindedness – high, need for cognition – low) with eight instances as opposed to 
only two put forward by those low on closed mindedness; low on externalist 
strategies: “If they were to put tiny signs up all over campus I don't know if I would 
like that” (internalist and externalist strategies – low), 10  compared to only one 
instance for those ranking high on the externalist scale; low on internalist strategies: 
“I feel that it is very important that hand sanitizer be distributed in universities” 
(internalist strategies – low), six compared to three; low need for cognition: “In my 
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opinion hand sanitizer should be provided around the university even if research 
shows that it may not be as affective as people think it really is” (need for cognition, 
development, and externalist strategies – low), seven to two; and low on the RCI: 
“But, at the end of the day everyone should just wash their hands. That works just 
as well if you take the time to do it”  (need for cognition, development, and 
internalist strategies – low), five to three. The only variable that did not show a 
difference in frequency was the discomfort with ambiguity scale. Four of the 
participants who used expressing preferences as a component of their opinion 
justification were also participants that did not access any of the information 
available to them.  
 
Openness to change. Codes and subcategories within this broader category 
were largely taken from responses to the question “Do you think your opinion 
could change in the future?” While some of the participants’ responses were a short 
“yes” or “no” many of the participants provided more detail into the possibility of 
change and what they perceived as necessary to prompt a change of their beliefs. 
There were four subcategories: change as contingent on something else (such as more 
information, research, or “proof”), change unlikely, change possible, and no. There 
were clear differences between groups in the type of response to given to this 
question.  
Across epistemic development, strategy, and motivation variables the 
individuals who described the possibility of change as contingent on some other 
factors were more often low on closed mindedness:  
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 I do think my opinion could change in the future and the first thing that 
comes to mind that might change it is context. Seeing as public schools are 
receiving less and less funding, I don't think that hand sanitizer should be 
very high on the priority list. If not having hand sanitizer, meant more 
funding for something more important, than [sic] my answer would be no. 
(discomfort with ambiguity and closed mindedness – low) 
six instances as opposed to three by those high on closed mindedness; low on 
discomfort with ambiguity: “Depending upon the research that is done and 
presented in the future, my opinion could possibly change” (discomfort with 
ambiguity – low, need for cognition – high), 10 compared to only four instances for 
those ranking high on the discomfort with ambiguity scale; high on externalist 
strategies: “In my view, all personal opinions should be dynamic, allowing for a 
more complex or accurate opinion based on reliable and recent information” 
(closed mindedness – low, development and internalist and externalist strategies – 
high), seven to four; high on internalist strategies: “My opinion could change if new 
information is presented or if the formula for hand sanitizer changes.” (internalist 
strategies and need for cognition – high, closed mindedness – low), seven to four; 
high need for cognition: “I think my opinion could change in the future if there 
were some study done that produced some strong evidence either for or against the 
use of hand sanitizer” (need for cognition – high), seven to five; and high on the 
development: “If more concrete, scientific proof was provided to me that said 
conclusively whether or not sanitizer is worth it I might change my 
mind”(development – high) nine to five. Caution does need to be taken, however, 
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although participants in these groups’ responses were more likely to discuss change 
as contingent, some of the participants did talk about contingencies that could have 
been satisfied by information that they had actually already accessed. For example 
one participant stated that their opinion may change if “test results come back and 
hand sanitizers are having detrimental results to its users, or they find out that hand 
sanitizers actually have no benefits, then I may change my mind” (development – 
high). However, they had already accessed two of the con articles about the risks of 
sanitizers including the article from infectioncontroltoday.com that linked sanitizer 
use to increased risks of norovirus. This seemed to be a pattern across participants 
on all four variables at both high and low ends of the scales, that they would state 
an openness to change and describe it as contingent on a certain type of 
information that the internet logs indicated that they had accessed, but which they 
either did not refer to in their responses or were dismissive of:  
Yes my opinion could change in the future if there were strong evidence that 
contradicts what we now know about the use of hand sanitizers. The 
information regarding how it does not protect against all viruses and that it 
could cause other ailments from overuse is not enough damaging evidence 
to suggest that the risks outweigh the benefits of promoting the use of hand 
sanitizers on University campuses. (internalist strategies - high) 
Individuals high on discomfort with ambiguity and closed mindedness and low on 
need for cognition, more frequently responded “no” or “unlikely” in answer to the 
question. However, this did not extend to individuals low on the development 
variable, and epistemic strategies variables, although these individuals were more 
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likely to indicate the problem as unimportant: “in my opinion, this is not a huge 
issue that is really important.” 
 
Source selection rationale. These rationales were mostly provided in 
response to the question “Why did you choose those sources?” Several different 
approaches to source selection emerged, these were: appearing first, balance, context, 
curiosity and interest, aspects of information anticipated, capturing attention, personal 
relevance, confirming beliefs, and perceived credibility of sources. 
Appearing first. First appearance in the Google page was a common reason 
for choosing specific websites, with frequency of this rationale being fairly even 
across categories. Some participants included in their responses some reference to 
previous experience of Google searches, for example: “I choose the first few sources 
presented within the google results page mainly because when I conduct my own 
google searches, I find that the first few articles are generally the most relative to the 
topic in question” (discomfort with ambiguity and closed mindedness – high). 
Although not all participants cited this as a reason for their selection, between six 
and eight participants out of ten in all of the groups opened the first source that 
appeared in their Google page first in their access sequence. Comparing the data on 
need for cognition, which was indicated in the quantitative results as having 
significant influence over VisitScore, the 20 participants highest and lowest on the 
variable did not differ χ2(1, N = 40) = .125, p = .73. Again, comparing the 20 
individuals highest and lowest on interest, there was no statistically significant 
difference χ2(1, N = 40) = 2.133, p = .144.  
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The frequency of opening the first link first in an individual’s access 
sequence did not appear to be impacted by the actual source that appeared first in 
Google. The difference between individuals who accessed the first link on GoogleA 
(22 out of 29) and those who accessed the first link on GoogleB (23 out of 31) was 
non-significant c2(1, N = 60) = .022, p = .881. This indicates that there was no 
difference between the first link being pro or con, as on GoogleA the first page was 
a pro sanitizer article and GoogleB was anti sanitizer. It also indicates that 
authority of the first source did not make individuals more or less likely to select the 
first link, as the first link from GoogleA was to livescience.com a reputable science 
website, while GoogleB was from whiteowlconspiracy.com a conspiracy blog. 
Capturing attention. Some variation of “Their titles jumped out at me” 
(discomfort with ambiguity - high, externalist and internalist – low) and “The 
Advantages of Alcohol Hand Sanitizer article as well as the Hand Sanitizer at 
Work May Lower the Number of Sick Days article stood out the most to me” 
(closed mindedness – high, development – low) were common explanation for 
source selection, particularly among high closed mindedness and discomfort with 
ambiguity; low need for cognition, low epistemic strategies, and low development 
groups. Although individuals in high need for cognition, strategy, and development 
groups, and low closed mindedness and discomfort with ambiguity groups, also 
used terms like “stood out” they tended to elaborate more “I also read these 
because the description sounded interesting or caught my attention,” (externalist 
strategies and development – high) whereas for the contrasting groups this was 
often the only explanation they provided. 
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Balance. Wanting “to see both sides of the argument” (development – high) 
was a common rationale for choosing sources on both sides of the argument. 
Participants who offered this reasoning were in all groups, although the highest 
frequencies (nine of ten participants) were in the low discomfort with ambiguity, 
and high externalist strategies (seven of ten) group. Lowest on this strategy were the 
low epistemic development and high discomfort with ambiguity groups, both with 
only two instances among the ten participants in each group.  
The next step from wanting to see both sides, was the desire to see all the 
available resources. This was not common among participants, with only three of 
the 60 qualitative participants choosing to do so (compared to six who chose to 
look at none at all). All of the participants who claimed to have looked at all of the 
sources, and who actually did, fell into the low groups on closed mindedness and 
discomfort with ambiguity, the high groups on need for cognition, development, 
and internalist epistemic strategies variables.  Common across these participants in 
their rationales was a desire to “make the most informed choice.”  
Curiosity and interest. Both interest and curiosity played a role in selection 
for some participants “I was curious to know if others believed that hand sanitizer 
could eliminate sick days in students and faculty” (discomfort with ambiguity - 
low), “ wondered what their getting the diploma had to do with sanitizer” (need for 
cognition – high, development – low). For one participant, their interest in the topic 
increased as they read more articles: “Each site intrigued me to read the next one. 
At first, I didn't think I needed to know that much information because I trusted 
hand sanitizers but after the negative reports, I wanted to keep reading” (internalist 
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– low). For some participants their interest in a particular article seemed to be less 
about an openness to new information, but more about being interested in articles 
that confirmed their pre-existing opinions “I chose this source because it looked the 
most interesting to me and I thought that it would have good information about 
being in public places and using hand sanitizers often [emphasis added].”  
Aspects of information anticipated. Eight participants talked about the 
information they thought they could get from the sources they selected. Some of 
this was more general “I decided that those sources seemed like they would give me 
the most information” (internalist and externalist – low). While others’ responses 
focused more on the specific information that they perceived the source could 
provide: “I also chose the "lowering the number of sick days" because that is 
extremely important as a student and a worker” (development – low). This sub 
category was not repeated enough to draw conclusions about frequencies between 
groups. 
Personal relevance. Three of the participants cited personal relevance as a 
reason they choose particular links to access. Although this wasn’t a common 
approach across participants, for the three participants that used this rationale, this 
was a key component of their explanations for choosing the sources they did. For 
example: “I chose those sources because the titles of them were the most interesting 
and related to my life” (closed mindedness – high, development – low). The 
personal relevance seemed to be tied to pro-sanitizer beliefs, and mention of health 
and hygiene in other open responses: 
I also chose the "lowering the number of sick days" because that is extremely 
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important as a student and a worker. I am a full time student balancing two 
jobs, and with most of my classes and my rent depending on my paycheck, I 
cannot miss school or work because of being sick. It was interesting to see, 
even though small, how the study affected the number of sick days taken 
and can even stop the smallest head cold or cough. (closed mindedness – 
high, development – low) 
Perceived credibility of sources. Although citing credibility of sources was a 
common selection rationale for individuals in the low discomfort with ambiguity, 
closed mindedness, and high need for cognition, epistemic strategies, and 
development groups, only one individual in the high discomfort with ambiguity 
group cited source credibility as a rationale for site selection: “They seemed to be 
somewhat more reliable than the others listed” (closed mindedness – low, 
discomfort with ambiguity, externalist and internalist strategies, need for cognition, 
and development – high). In the low need for closure, high development, strategy, 
and need for cognition groups judgments about the credibility of sources were 
frequently stated as selection rationales. These were stated both generally “And I 
used the livescience sourced [sic] because it appeared reputable in regards to the 
information I was seeking” (development, need for cognition, and externalist 
strategies – high) and more specifically, drawing on knowledge or inferences about 
the sites themselves:  
Blogs are often very opinionated, so I chose to avoid those as well as any site 
with "conspiracy" in its title. The Washington Post and Live Science are 
both reputable sources that are more likely to be scientific and objective. 
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Livestrong has been enshrined in controversy lately, so I avoided it as well. 
(closed mindedness – low; need for cognition, epistemic development, and 
internalist strategies – high). 
Other individuals talked about their usual approaches to determining credibility 
and their lack of ability to do that with this particular set of sites “Normally, when I 
do research for stuff I would like to know about I look at sources with .org 
addresses or from expert resources” (discomfort with ambiguity – low, need for 
cognition – high).  
Confirming beliefs. In contrast, individuals in the high discomfort with 
ambiguity and closed mindedness, low need for cognition, strategies, and 
development were much more likely to provide a confirming belief rationale for 
selecting sources: “I had hears [sic] about this information before and chose the link 
to confirm what I had heard” (discomfort with ambiguity – high, internalist and 
externalist strategies – high). Although not explicit in her response to the question, 
this participant, who only accessed pro websites, also appeared to be confirming 
beliefs: “My parents as well as teachers growing up really encouraged the use of 
hand sanitizer so I was more prone to read the article about the advantages rather 
than the disadvantages” (closed mindedness – high, development – low). 
 
Source helpfulness rationale. These codes emerged largely from the last 
question, participants were first asked to indicate on a scale of 1-4 and 0 for “did 
not read” how helpful they found the sources. In the open response questions they 
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were then asked to explain why the sites they had ranked most highly were the 
most helpful. Some of the responses to the previous question about site selection fell 
more into this category than in selection rationales, those responses were coded and 
are included in this section. Several of the source selection rationale sub-categories 
reappear in this category. The distinction was made between similar phrases that if 
the participant talked about the title, domain name, or snippet of information 
contained on the Google page this was an example of a source selection rationale. If 
participants talked about the actual content, or information that could only be 
found from reading the article and not from the search page this would count as an 
example of source helpfulness rationale.  
Balance. There were eleven different instances of discussions of balance in 
the data. This seemed to be used in two different ways, the primary use of balance 
was to talk about the range of sites available and the two or more sites that they 
indicated as being most helpful as representing two sides of the arguments: “These 
sources gave useful information about the risks and benefits of using hand 
sanitizer” (closed mindedness - low, need for cognition and externalist strategies – 
high) and seeing both opinions on the subject “although some articles which is not 
support my opinion but i still would like to follow my thoughts, but it is nice to 
know different opinions [sic]” (discomfort with ambiguity - low). A second way in 
which balance was expressed was to talk about breadth of information within 
particular articles: “I believed these were most helpful because they were very broad 
and did not have opinion based facts” (internalist strategies - high). There seemed 
to be no clear differences between groups in how often this was provided as a 
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rationale for the highest ranking of the most helpful sources. 
Relevance. This encompasses both personal relevance of the information to their 
lives: “They intrigued me with the titles and wanted me to read more into it because 
of its value to my daily lifestyle” (discomfort with ambiguity - high) and relevance to 
the question: “I found this the most helpful because people would not want to lose 
days of school because of them being sick” (development – low). In many cases 
these two rationales greatly overlapped. This approach to justification of the 
sources used, seemed to be most often tied to the “hand sanitizer at work may 
lower the number of sick days” livescience.com article and occurred only in the 
high discomfort with ambiguity and closed mindedness, and low development and 
internalist strategies groups. 
Aspects of the information provided. There were 23 instances of general 
discussion about the information that the sources they selected contained using 
words such as enough: “I did not read all of the articles because I felt that I was 
educated enough on this topic after reading the articles that I had” (discomfort with 
ambiguity – low), new: “The white owl conspiracy page was also interesting 
because it presented information I had not heard before” (closed mindedness – 
high, development – low), good: “They gave good information” (closed mindedness 
- high), and accurate: “I thought they gave accurate information” (need for cognition 
– high). There were no frequency differences on this sub-category; although at a 
finer grain of coding comparing those responses that talked about the information 
giving them better understanding of the subject: “I felt that they provided enough 
information to help me understand the research that has been done on the topic” 
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(closed mindedness – low) versus just “good information” or a focus more on the 
clarity “I found them being short and to the point, while still giving the important 
information to me” (closed mindedness – high) seem to reveal more differences 
between participant approaches. 
Interest. This sub-category occurred three times in the data. The three 
instances were: “It was the most interesting out of the ones I read” (internalist, 
externalist, need for cognition, development – low), “I found the work place article 
interesting and thought it had given me a good amount of information to answer 
more questions” (ambiguity, closure – high, need for cognition – high), and “I 
found those sources most helpful because I agreed with what they had to say and 
their points were interesting” (closed mindedness - high, need for cognition – low).  
Confirming beliefs. As in the source selection rationale category, responses 
here focused on the alignment between the information provided in the source and 
their own beliefs. For example: “I found these two most helpful because they 
presented me with information that I already find to be true in regards to hand 
sanitizers” (need for cognition, development, externalist strategies - high). This 
approach was most common among high closed-mindedness, however, the 
example provided is from an individual scoring highly on need for cognition, the 
RCI, and the externalist strategy instrument. 
Credibility. There were twelve instances of students referring to credibility in 
some form including reliability of the information, objectivity, and legitimacy. 
Examples for reliability include: “They sounded reliable, and seemed to be telling 
the truth” (externalist strategies and development – high). For objectivity: 
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“Objectivity, scientific data, and examples made this site the most helpful” 
(development, internalist and externalist strategies – high; closed mindedness - low) 
and “The study was sponsored by a University, not one of the hand sanitizers 
company. It is of my understanding that the study was unbiased, which is essential 
when forming an opinion” (discomfort with ambiguity and externalist strategies – 
high). Legitimacy: “The sites that I thought were most helpful seemed to provide 
valid information that seemed legitimate” (discomfort with ambiguity, closed 
mindedness, need for cognition, development – low). As is evident from the 
examples, use of this justification cut across groups in somewhat unexpected ways 
particularly in individuals who were high in the proposed “epistemic vices” of 
discomfort with ambiguity and closed mindedness, but also high in the proposed 
“virtue” need for cognition as well as epistemic development.  
Facts and truth. Use of the word “truth” was applied in two ways. Firstly as 
equated with data: “I thought that the white owl site was very informative and 
brought legitimate sources such as doctors perspectives and scientific information to 
show how important and true the use of hand sanitizer is” (development – low; 
closed mindedness - high) and “They revolved mostly around facts, research and 
data” (discomfort with ambiguity – low; externalist and internalist strategies - high). 
Secondly as a more general intuition: “I believe that the new information was 
enlightening with a lot of truth to them” (development, internalist strategies, need 
for cognition – high; discomfort with ambiguity and closed mindedness – low) and 
“They sounded reliable, and seemed to be telling the truth” (externalist strategies 
and development – high). Another example about intuitions or beliefs about the 
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truth of the information is this: “Also, I did not think that the information about 
hand sanitizer lowering the number of sick days was that helpful because after 
reading the first article about it not being affective, I did not find the information to 
be true” (closed mindedness – high). This participant was high on closed 
mindedness and, similar to the first example in this category that was also given by 
an individual high in closed mindedness, both participants began with positive view 
of sanitizer but opened the first link on their GoogleB webpages – “Think hand 
sanitizers protect you against germs? Think again…” from 
whiteowlconspiracy.com – and in their responses seem to have stuck, (or have 
seized and frozen (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996)) on this material. The participant 
from the first example read only the first article, while the participant whose 
response was just provided accessed several sources on both sides of the argument, 
but did not discuss any other sources in their responses except for in this section, 
where they dismissed the resources as untruthful. 
Research and data. Although there was significant overlap with other sub-
categories, the focus on research and data, and also the process of reliable research 
did emerge as a separate category containing coded phrases not captured elsewhere. 
This differed from the “facts and truth” category in that the responses focused more 
on the scientific process and research as a source of information rather than data 
and truth as a property of the data. Examples include: “The lowering of sicks days 
by using the hand sanitizer was a good article to read. It had a long period of time 
that several individuals were followed in order to see if the experiment was effective 
or not” (internalist, externalist strategies - high) and “I found the hand sanitizer 
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article relating to lowering sick days the most helpful because it presented 
information I believed to be well researched” (closed, discomfort with ambiguity - 
high). Again, there was no evidence of great differences in the frequency of this 
approach between groups. 
Clarity and conciseness. Issues of clarity and conciseness both in information, 
but also the actual layout of the webpage itself emerged as one of the more 
common sub-categories within the broader category of source helpfulness 
rationales. Examples include: “It was easy to glance and see what the website 
thought about hand sanitizer, I didn't really have to work to find the information” 
(need for cognition, internalist, externalist – low; discomfort with ambiguity - high) 
and “I thought the livestrong [sic] advantages article was the most clear and concise 
in making its points about how hand sanitizer can help” (development – low, 
closed - high). Frequency was similar across groups.   
Read. This sub category reflected the very literal response of “They were the 
only ones I looked at” to the question of why the individual rated the sources they 
did most highly on helpfulness. Three participants provided this response in the 
high discomfort with ambiguity, high closed mindedness, and low closed 
mindedness groups. 
Prompting reflection. In contrast with “I read these” as a response, this sub-
category captures sources that individuals described as “just made me think” 
(discomfort with ambiguity - low; need for cognition – high). Participants using the 
approach, or preference for particular sources talked about how the sites facilitated 
reflection “Even though they had different opinions about hand sanitizer, they 
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made me think about what I believe on the subject” (need for cognition – high). 
Overall frequency was too low to discern differences between groups.  
Anti-rationales. The final category of anti-rationales, captures those 
justifications that focus more on the negatives of the sources they rated as 
unhelpful, rather than the positives of the sources they rated more highly. There 
were only three instances of this, with the participants falling in the Development - 
high, internalist and externalist strategies – low groups. An example of this 
approach: “I found them all equally unhelpful. Most of them didn't rely on sources 
that I could see and made broad generalizations” (development – high). 
 
Strategies and context: secondary analysis. As the third group of research 
questions focused on the links between the epistemic strategies reported at the domain 
general level and those exhibited during the online search task, and question 1(c) 
focused on the influence of context, four additional file sets were created by sorting 
the data by the epistemic strategies variables and looking for the two individuals 
with the highest and lowest levels of interest in the topic. Interest was selected as a 
key variable following the quantitative analysis, which revealed interest as having 
an influence over perceptions of information sufficiency. The demographic 
information of these participants, as well as their scores on the epistemic strategy, 
development, and motivation variables; task variables: interest, risk, initial opinion, 
and information sufficiency; and the specific pages visited along with the sequence 
in which they were accessed and how this relates to the sequence on the page are 






Demographic Information for High/Low Epistemic Strategy with High/Low Interest 
Participants 
 Interest  Age Gender Ethnicity Semesters 
HI-HI-A 29 Male African American 13 
High 
HI-HI-B 20 Female Caucasian 4 




HI-LI-B 19 Female Caucasian 4 
LI-HI-A 21 Female Caucasian 6 
High 
LI-HI-B 20 Female African American 7 




LI-LI-B 20 Female Hispanic 4 
HE-HI-A 21 Female Caucasian 8 
High 
HE-HI-B 20 Female Caucasian 5 




HE-LI-B 20 Female Caucasian 4 
HE-HI-A 23 Female Caucasian 10 
High 
LE-HI-B 20 Female Caucasian 4 
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For the source selection rationale and the source helpfulness rationale there were 
numerous subcategories and responses were often quite short such that there was 
much less overlap between participants making frequency counts between 
groupings largely uninformative. Therefore, the mixed-method analysis of 
influences of interest on individuals scoring high and low on the internalist and 
externalist epistemic strategy variables will focus only on forms of justification and 
openness to change. In terms of source selection rationale the sequences for these 
individuals can be viewed in Table 12, and show no apparent difference in the 
frequency of first source selection, with seven of the eight participants high on 
either strategy accessing the first link first in their search sequence (see Table 12). 
Forms of Justification. As found in the main analysis the three main 
approaches to justification used by participants were also found in the internalist 
and externalist epistemic strategy sub-groups. These were: providing evidence, 
asserting beliefs, and expressing preferences. 
Evidence. When sorting the information for high and low interest combined 
with high internalist and externalist scores there did seem to be some differences in 
the amount of justification provided for beliefs. These differences on interest were 
not as clear for those with low scores on the epistemic strategy variables. The 
differences were, however, confounded by the strength and valence of the 
participants’ original opinions. Individuals who were interested in the topic tended 
to have strongly favorable pre-existing opinions of hand sanitizer, whereas 
individuals who had low interest in the topic tended to have neutral or only slightly 
positive or negative views of hand sanitizer. In terms of their patterns of 
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justification, that meant that individuals high on interest focused more on the pro-
hand sanitizer sources and providing more pro-hand sanitizer examples, for 
instance: “There can be no 100% replacement of old fashioned soap and water 
hand washing procedures, but the use of alcohol based hand sanitizers is effective 
enough to prevent most medicine resistant bacteria and virus” (HE-HI-A). Whereas 
their disinterested counterparts who began with slightly negative initial views 
focused on the inefficacy of hand sanitizer and sources that supported that stance 
“Hand sanitizer fails to exterminate all germs and the effects only last for a 
maximum of two minutes before it is necessary to re-apply” (HI-LI-A). As is 
reflective of the sources accessed (see Table 11), the pairs of individuals higher on 
internalism and externalism referenced the more authoritative sources, particularly 
those individuals who were higher in interest. Individuals with low interest who 
were also low on either epistemic strategy largely maintained their original stance 
and either accessed no sources at all, or were dismissive in their justifications of 
sources opposing their initial views on the topic. For example, this participant had a 
neutral view on the topic and, despite reading both a pro and con source, did not 
reference the pro source beyond this statement in their justification of opinion: “I 
do feel that promotion of the product may not change the number of students who 
take sick days” (LE-LI-B). 
Asserting beliefs. Comparing these pairs of individuals with high and low 
scores on the two epistemic strategy variables combined with high and low interest, 
there were differences in the frequency of belief assertion as justification. Pairs of 
individuals with high levels of externalist and internalist strategies and high interest 
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provided more support in the form of beliefs than their disinterested counterparts. 
Similar to use of evidence, the differences in frequency comparing those of low and 
high interest were not as clear for those with low scores on the epistemic strategy 
variables. The pair of individuals high on the internalist measure at both high and 
low ends of the interest continuum expressed more beliefs as justification than those 
low on this measure whether highly interested or disinterested. The same problem 
occurred in this analysis with interest being associated with strength and valence of 
beliefs. For example those who began with neutral or only slightly positive opinions 
tended to focus more on financial arguments to dismiss the promotion and 
purchase of hand sanitizer: “Wasting taxpayers and students money on hand 
sanitizer would be wrong. Money should be put towards more worthwhile 
projects” (HE-LI-A).  
Expressing preferences. Looking to the high and low epistemic strategy pairs 
with high and low interest, the statement of preference approach for justification 
was only used by individuals low on the externalist and internalist strategies. High 
interest with low externalist participants used the strategy the most with four 
instances to only two in the low interest pair. There was only one instance of this 
strategy in the low internalist/low interest pair. 
Openness to change. Subcategories and codes for the openness to change 
category largely came from the responses to the question “Do you think your 
opinion could change in the future?” Focusing on the change as contingent 
subcategory and comparing these subgroups organized by high and low interest, 
high and low externalist and internalist epistemic strategies, the differences are less 
126 
 
clear than on the broader groups based only on the variables, without including 
interest as an organizer. Many of those individuals who had high interest at both 
high and low epistemic strategy levels already had strong pre-existing opinions on 
the issue, which may have been a factor in them being less likely to change 
opinions, or to only change opinion based on strong counter-evidence such as “If 
there were to be new research that comes up that is harmful and a health risk, then 
this would be the only reason to change my mind about placing hand sanitizer on 
university campuses” (HE-HI-A). Of the pairs who were low on interest those 
individuals who were high on epistemic strategy remained fairly neutral and due to 
the lack of importance could not foresee their opinion changing:  
I do not think my opinion on this subject will change in the future. Unless 
test results come back and hand sanitizers are having detrimental results to 
its users, or they find out that hand sanitizers actually have no benefits, then 
I may change my mind. But in my opinion, this is not a huge issue that is 
really important. I think it would be fine if universities decide to promote the 
use, but in reality I don't think they would really be loosing [sic] much if they 
decide against the promotion. Students are going to do what they want, no 
one can force them to do something. If they want to use it they will, if not, 
they won't. (HE-LI-B) 
Those individuals low in interest and low on epistemic strategy were split between 
two individuals open to change:  
Yes I think my opinion could change in the future. With more information 
about the topic, such as how the universities would promote the use of the 
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hand sanitizer I might be more inclined to lean one way over the other. (LE-
LI-A)  
and two who were adamantly unlikely to change: “I highly doubt it... I am not and 
never will be a germ freak” (HI-LI-B). 
 
Access sequence. The final portion of the qualitative results focus not on the 
written responses but on an analysis of the sequence of link access via the Internet 
logfiles. As noted earlier in the qualitative analysis, accessing the first link first in an 
individual’s access sequence was very common with 41 of the 60 participants 
whose responses were analyzed quantitatively following this pattern. In order to 
further investigate this phenomenon I selected out the two individuals scoring 
highest, and lowest on the RCI who had also access to GoogleA to compare their 
approach to the information. In looking at the t-test no statistically significant 
difference was found in whether individuals began with the first link as dependent 
on whether they had access to GoogleA or GoogleB. Therefore A was selected as 
first in alphabetical order, as the sequence of links in the browser did not appear to 





Figure 4. Image showing the sequence of visits by participants assigned to Google 
version A who scored highest and lowest on the RCI Questionnaire.  
All four of the participants were female Education majors. Both LOW-A 
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and lower limits of the range. Table 13 shows their scores on pre and post task 
questions as well as their scores on epistemic strategies, development, and 
motivation scores. 
As shown in Table 13, although HIGH-A and HIGH-B were the highest 
development scores for those participants assigned to Google version A, they 
differed on epistemic motivation by more than one standard deviation on all three 
of the scores, with HIGH-A scoring lower on both closed mindedness and 
discomfort with ambiguity (need for closure), and higher on need for cognition. 
Although HIGH-A scored lower on the evidence scale of the epistemic strategies 
instrument than HIGH-B, she scored higher on the concept scale. The concept scale 
focuses on links between information and understanding, so the many jumps back 
and forth between pages and multiple visits to some of the available sources is 
interesting and reflects the connections described by many of the items on the scale. 
HIGH-A’s rationale for selecting all of the sources also echoes ideas of 
understanding that underlie the concept scale “I chose to read them all because I 
wanted to hear all the opinions that were available to me to make the most 
informed choice about the topic and issues” Additional factors that may have 
influenced their approaches to the available sources were the difference in their 
interest, perception of risk, and importance of understanding to the topic. HIGH-
A’s scores on risk, interest, understanding were higher than that of HIGH-B’s, and 
may also have influenced her greater engagement with the materials. Whereas 
HIGH-B was very clear about the lack of importance she placed on the topic in her 




Epistemic and Task scores for participants shown in Figure 4. 
Participant INT RIS UND PK IO SI ED ES1 ES2 EM1 EM2 EM3 
A 5.67 5.33 5.33 6 2 6 1.83 4.35 4.75 5.71 3.63 4.83 LOW 
B 6.00 6.00 6.00 6 3 4 3.00 3.35 3.63 5.00 4.00 4.28 
HIGH A 5.00 4.00 5.00 4 2 7 5.83 6.24 4.88 2.29 1.38 5.78 
 B 3.00 3.00 3.67 3 1 6 5.90 5.29 5.75 4.29 3.75 4.44 
Note. INT = Topic interest, RIS = Perceived personal risk, UND = Importance of understanding, 
PK = Prior knowledge, IO = Initial opinion, SI = Sufficiency of information; ED = RCI, ES1 = 
Concept, ES2 = Evidence, EM1 = Discomfort with ambiguity, EM2 = Closed mindedness, EM3 
= Need for cognition.  
 
 
“I do not think my opinion on this subject will change in the future. Unless 
test results come back and hand sanitizers are having detrimental results to 
its users, or they find out that hand sanitizers actually have no benefits, then 
I may change my mind. But in my opinion, this is not a huge issue that is 
really important. I think it would be fine if universities decide to promote the 
use, but in reality I don't think they would really be loosing much if they 
decide against the promotion. Students are going to do what they want, no 
one can force them to do something. If they want to use it they will, if not, 
they won't” 
Although LOW-A and LOW-B were the lowest scores for participants who 
saw version A of the Google page, their RCI scores were more than one standard 
deviation apart with LOW-B having the higher of the two scores. All three 
epistemic motivation scores were within one standard deviation of one another, 
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however, LOW-A had higher scores on both the concept and evidence scales of the 
epistemic strategies scale. Her rationale for the source selection she made focused 
on relevance “I felt that it was relevant to me. I work in a restaurant and am an 
education major. If there is something that I can do to keep myself from missing 
work and school now or missing work once I become a teacher, I am going to do 
all I can” while LOW-B’s rationale for the selection was that “it was the first one 
that really drew my attention” Although HIGH-B’s rationale also focused on the 
resources being first, her rationale also included some reflection on past experiences 
with the search engine and the sequence of resources provided on the page “these 
were the first sources to pop up. Usually in my opinion, those are the most relevant 
to the topic and the most popular” She also talks about interest and wanting to read 
both sides of the argument “I also read these because the description sounded 
interesting or caught my attention. I also wanted to read both the positive and 
negative opinions” This idea of balance, was an aspect clearly missing from the 
approach of both LOW-A and B to the information, both of whom accessed only 
the first article on the page, an article that happened to agree with their opinions on 
the topic prior to viewing any information.  
LOW-A had the highest score on discomfort with ambiguity of all four of 
the participants shown in the illustration, and in line with previous findings from 
studies using the need for closure scale (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), showed signs 
of seizing and freezing on the information she accessed. Student sickness and 
attendance at work and school were mentioned as the sole piece of evidence for her 
opinion on hand sanitizer following her access to the information. In addition, it 
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was also the only justification for why her opinion was unlikely to change in the 
future: “Attendance is so important and sickness is not something that sound [sic] 
interfere when schools can take action to prevent it” 
Another interesting difference between approaches to and perceptions of 
information occurs between HIGH-B and LOW-A. Despite HIGH-B’s lack of 
interest and perceived risk involved with the introduction of hand sanitizer, she still 
read four articles representing both sides of the topic. LOW-A had higher scores on 
all three contextual aspects: interest, perceived risk, and importance of 
understanding and yet only read one article, which was in agreement with her 
original position. Despite this difference in the number of sources accessed, both 
HIGH-B and LOW-A indicated “agree” in response to the statement “I feel I have 
read enough information to form an opinion on the subject” This gives us some 
insight into epistemic standard setting in information contexts. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
The current study put forward a model of epistemic cognition whereby the 
three different approaches to personal epistemologies, epistemic development, 
strategies, and motivations, were integrated. Data were collected on participants’ 
epistemic behaviors in an online context and follow up questions asked them to 
reflect on their processes of justification to arrive at their opinions. Survey data on 
the three epistemic components were also collected and both quantitative and 
mixed methods analyses were conducted in order to investigate the three research 
questions.  
In terms of finding out how the domain-general epistemic strategies, 
development, and motivations are related to the epistemic standards set and 
epistemic behaviors displayed in a specific knowledge-forming context, some 
information about the possible relationships were discovered. Moderate 
correlations among all six of the epistemic development, motivation, and strategies 
variables indicate that they are related, though not measuring the same thing. 
Correlations of both internalist and externalist epistemic strategies, discomfort with 
ambiguity, and need for cognition with the aggregate VisitTime score, which 
represents both the level of authority of the sources accessed and the time spent 
reading, indicates that the proposed components: epistemic strategies and 
motivations do have some influence over epistemic behaviors in online knowledge-
forming contexts. A multiple regression of the three proposed epistemic motivation 
variables on VisitScore indicated that both need for cognition and discomfort with 
ambiguity explaining significant variance in VisitScore. 
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Interestingly the level of epistemic development did not directly correlate 
with any of the epistemic behavior indicators. It was, however, negatively 
correlated with closed mindedness, and positively correlated with need for 
cognition; indicating that there may be a mediated role for development in a model 
of epistemic cognition. Mediation analysis provided some evidence of this, as 
multiple mediation analyses indicated need for cognition as a potential mediator 
(CI 95%[1.51, 114.53]) of the indirect effect from epistemic development to 
VisitScore. However, there is reason to proceed with caution, as a contrast analysis 
between the discomfort with ambiguity and need for cognition indirect paths 
indicated that the difference between the indirect effect through discomfort with 
ambiguity and that through need for cognition is non-significant (CI 95%[-96.94, 
29.85]). It may be the case that the instrument for epistemic development is not 
sufficiently reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = .63) despite the structure of the task and 
the model. It may be the case that only three scenarios are not sufficient to capture 
the level of epistemic development particularly given the possible variation of 
application within the soft stage model. Further investigation, including 
longitudinal studies, into the relationships between epistemic development, 
motivations, and strategies is necessary to understand the directionality of the 
influences on epistemic behaviors both in knowledge forming context as well as 
over the course of learning and development.  
The finding that Balance was not correlated with any of the proposed 
individual level components of the model was surprising. This may have been due 
to the scale of measurement, although the range and standard deviation appear to 
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be sufficiently large following the normal score transformation. It may also be due 
to the nature of the task itself, and the set-up of the Google pages. Perhaps some 
individuals who may not otherwise have been motivated to look for information on 
both sides of an argument did look at both sides because they were included in the 
first few “hits” and because they knew their online activities were being logged. 
Similarly, the trivial nature of the task as perceived by other participants may have 
influenced individuals who may usually be more highly motivated to explore both 
sides of an argument to just read the first couple of pages and stop the search 
process. Alternatively, this may be an indication that there are other mediating, or 
perhaps moderating variables influencing the relationship between epistemic 
development, motivation, and strategies and Balance such that there are only 
relative small direct influences.  
The finding that Sufficiency of Information and VisitScore were not 
significantly correlated was also interesting. The Sufficiency of Information 
question asked participants, after they had had time to look at the information, 
whether they felt they had enough information to form a justified opinion. While it 
was not directly related to VisitScore, there was some evidence that sufficiency was 
related to some degree to context. Although contextual factors did not directly 
influence VisitScore or Balance, they did relate to the Sufficiency of Information 
item. Both interest and risk accounted for variance in Sufficiency of Information, 
with higher risk predicting lower scores on Sufficiency of Information and higher 
interest predicting higher scores. In addition, the externalist strategies variable was 
also indicated in a multiple regression as predicting some of the variance in the 
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Sufficiency of Information score.  The lack of a direct effect of interest and risk on 
the VisitScore measure of epistemic behaviors may be indicative of the influence of 
some other factor. It may also be the case that there is some moderated mediation 
occurring whereby some interest and risk perception influence individuals 
differently depending on the level of some other factor (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 
2007). Particularly in light of the qualitative analysis indicating a difference in the 
impact of interest depending on levels of epistemic strategies and development. 
Investigation of the possibility of moderated mediation was beyond the scope of the 
current study and sample size. However, the qualitative data does indicate that this 
is an avenue worthy of future investigation. 
The apparent link between interest, the strength of pre-existing opinions 
(particularly pro-sanitizer opinions), and epistemic strategy use was also 
informative. Interest seemed to influence participants at the higher end of strategy 
use to access more information and use more evidence-based strategies for 
justification. Those scoring lower on epistemic strategy use with high interest did 
not seem to be as strongly influenced to look at more information. These 
individuals also tended to supply more belief based sources of justification. This 
differential influence of interest may relate to the previously hypothesized latent 
factor, possibly of self-regulation, but also to an interaction between problem 
definition and epistemic motivations. High epistemic strategy use was correlated 
with lower scores on the two need for closure scales: discomfort with ambiguity, 
and closed mindedness and high in need for cognition. It is therefore possible that 
interest may be related to the problem definition. Perhaps those higher in need for 
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closure and high in interest, define the problem as unambiguous and therefore more 
aligned with their epistemic motivations. Those with high interest and a high need 
for cognition may be more interested because their definition of the problem is as 
more complex. This possibility has implications for the study of epistemic cognition 
and designing studies that look at contextual influences on individuals both in 
terms of the type of model that would capture these complexities, but also in 
designing studies that would capture the differences in contextual influence in 
meaningful ways. While hand sanitizer as a topic did avoid many of the issues 
associated with more morally controversial topics, such that the differences in 
justification strategies were not “washed out” by religious or political beliefs. The 
perception of the level of complexity of the problem may not have been as high. 
One suggestion for overcoming these difficulties may be to use more authentic 
situations, perhaps tied to class assignment, so that participants may be more likely 
to be engaged in the topic in a way that many likely were not in this scenario.  
Questions about the relation between standards and behavior were not 
adequately answered by the current study. Two items were designed to capture 
standards – importance of understanding and Sufficiency of Information. Importance of 
understanding behaved more like a contextual factor, and even in that framework 
only correlated with interest and risk, and with epistemic strategies and need for 
closure, not with the hypothesized VisitScore variable. Surprisingly, sufficiency of 
information, which asked participants whether they felt they had enough 
information in order to form a justified opinion, was also not significantly 
correlated with VisitScore, although perceptions of risk, interest, and externalist 
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epistemic strategies were shown in regression analyses to be related. Both items 
were perhaps more reflective of different participant conceptions of what constitutes 
“understanding” and “justification” and therefore not useful as indicative of a 
direct relationship with VisitScore. Rather, the sufficiency of information might 
better be thought of as a proportion out of 7, with for instance a 6 out of 7 
representing that I have 6/7ths of the information I need to form a justified opinion 
so that it is scaled by the amount of information that the individual actually 
accessed. The “importance of understanding” scale, was correlated with internalist 
epistemic strategies, r = .36, p < .01, and with externalist epistemic strategies, r = 
.35, p < .01, and therefore somewhat consistent with the idea that it is conceptions 
of understanding rather than a standard that is being captured by this item.  
This difficulty in capturing epistemic standards may also be reflective of 
shifting standards. As described by one of the participants as part of their source 
selection rationale: “Each site intrigued me to read the next one. At first, I didn't 
think I needed to know that much information because I trusted hand sanitizers but 
after the negative reports, I wanted to keep reading.” Although this idea of 
changing standards and redefinition of the task was only articulated by one of the 
participants whose responses were analyzed qualitatively, it may be the case that 
several of the participants began with different standards than those that emerged 
during the information search part of the task. For some, this may have been a pre-
existing opinion that was challenged, as for this participant, or it may have been the 
case that some participants began with a low risk perception that changed upon 
reading about potential risks, or participants who had high risk and interest 
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perceptions but whose beliefs were confirmed with the first site and therefore felt no 
need to search any further. It may also be the case that there is some other factor 
not accounted for by the variables included in the current study. One potential 
avenue for investigation might be the role of self-regulation in the model of 
epistemic cognition. 
The mixed-method evidence does seem to suggest that standards as shifting 
and dynamic may be a more reasonable approach to depicting what happens during 
epistemic cognition. This lends significant support for the need to conduct more 
qualitative and mixed-method studies into epistemic cognition across a variety of 
contexts. In online settings, think aloud procedures, screen capturing, and even eye-
tracking studies may be useful in order to really investigate what information 
individuals are looking at in order to form opinions and to get some insight via 
think alouds for the processes behind link selection. Repeated measures over time 
during a knowledge forming task may be another more quantitative approach; 
however, unless very carefully structured, this may have the potential, even more 
than a think aloud, for participants to be prompted to report processes for 
justification, or even to use them, than they otherwise might have in a more 
authentic situation.  
Questions related to the specific relationship between epistemic strategies 
enacted in the task and those captured at the domain general level. The mixed 
method analysis comparing individuals with the highest and lowest scores on the 
epistemic strategies instrument on their qualitative responses did provide some 
insight into this relationship, however the small sample did not allow for enough in 
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context strategy data to be collected for quantitization (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 
2007) and statistical analysis. However comparison of frequencies did indicate, for 
instance that those individuals higher on externalist strategies were more likely to 
provide evidence from sources rather than provide beliefs, and more likely to 
express an openness to change based on evidence, which is consistent with the 
rationale behind the scale. Further investigation into the relationships on a much 
larger scale are necessary to determine both the validity of the instrument, as well as 
the relationship between domain general and task specific strategy use. 
There were some difficulties with the open response items. Not all 
participants provided full responses to the questions, meaning that they may not 
have been describing all of the strategies they used. There was a certain amount of 
overlap in responses to the open response question and consequently between the 
third and fourth categories that emerged in the qualitative analysis: source selection 
rationale and source helpfulness rationale. This made it difficult to tease apart the actual 
reason why individuals looking at the Google pages chose to access the sources 
they did from those they did not, versus why the sources they selected were good 
sources to have chosen. This was possibly due to individuals not remembering in 
retrospect why they chose to click on a particular link, or what information was 
available to them prior to accessing the page, whereas remembering the information 
from the page itself and being able to rationalize the decision for why that page was 
a good selection would have been far easier to recall. Therefore, the responses and 
codes that arose from this section are perhaps not as informative as they might have 
been had this information been collected in another manner. Despite this, the 
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Internet logs do provide some insight into the selection rationale, in many cases 
more so than the open responses, particularly for those participants whose access 
sequence works through the web links in the order that they appeared on the 
Google simulation. Because selection of materials is such an important part of 
epistemic cognition, and knowledge formation, this limitation of the current study 
provides another strong case for using a think-aloud protocol in order to try to 
capture that decision making process in the moment it is actually made, rather than 
asking participants recall their reasoning in retrospect. This is particularly 
important, as selecting appropriate sources and being able to provide a rationale for 
that source selection are both key components of information literacy standards 
across a range of subjects (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 
1993; Association of College and Research Libraries, 2000; National Governors 
Association Center for Best Practices, 2010). 
Related to this is the finding that a large proportion of participants selected 
the first source that appeared in their Google page, across groups. Of course, as the 
Google pages were propagated with resources, they were all relevant to the topic. 
However, an authentic search task is necessary in order to ascertain whether this is 
a common strategy, or if the relevance of all of the available pages to the topic 
skewed the likelihood of first page being selected. Evidence of seizing in formation 
contained in the first page accessed, and freezing that opinion (Kruglanski & 
Webster, 1996) either by being dismissive of findings in contradictory articles, or by 
only accessing article in support of that view in individuals with high need for 
closure was interesting. This indicates that further analysis of the data with regards 
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to changes of opinion from before the task to after the information has been access 
may be a fruitful avenue for investigation. 
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Further Study 
Although both purely quantitative as well as mixed method investigations 
into the relationships between scores on the epistemic strategies scales indicated 
that the two epistemic strategy dimensions measured by the items were related both 
to other general level epistemic variables and the epistemic behaviors enacted in the 
online knowledge-forming task, caution must be taken. Confirmatory factor 
analysis was unable to confirm the theoretical factor structure of the Adapted 
Epistemic Beliefs Scale (Hennessey, 2007). However, an EFA indicated a two-
factor structure with externalist strategies – those based on evidence external to the 
knower, and internalist strategies – those based on connections between evidence 
and existing knowledge, and connections between existing understandings, which 
was theoretically defensible. The differences between the factor structure of the new 
instrument as indicated by the exploratory factor analysis, and that of the 
instrument on which it was originally based (Hennessey, 2007) calls into question 
the adapted instrument’s validity. The current study did not include a thorough 
validity study of the instrument and thus only has evidence for the internal 
reliability of the scale items, and the results of the exploratory factor analysis. No 
further evidence is available as to whether the reliability of the items holds over 
time, or if the factor structure can be replicated in a different sample. Correlations 
in the expected directions with measures of epistemic motivations and epistemic 
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development offer some concurrent validity for the scales. Additionally, the focus 
in the qualitative portion of the study on a selected group of individuals falling high 
and low on the two proposed epistemic strategies dimensions also provides some 
construct validity evidence. However, in order to validate the construct, as well as 
to more thoroughly investigate the relationships between strategies in context and 
those captured by the instrument, a much larger study of the relationship would 
need to be conducted including both belief justification and information selection 
components of epistemic behaviors in context. 
Responses to the “possibility of change” question raise some doubts about 
the validity of self-report measures. Here many participants reported that they were 
open to change, however, did not actually take on board information that fit the 
criteria they stated for change to occur. For example this participant described a 
change of opinion as contingent on if “test results come back and hand sanitizers 
are having detrimental results to its users, or they find out that hand sanitizers 
actually have no benefits, then I may change my mind” (development – high.) 
However, as described the participant had already accessed an article that linked 
sanitizer use to increased risks of norovirus.  Although statements of contingent 
change occurred more often in participants scoring low on the need for closure 
instrument, both the survey instrument and the open response items are self-reports 
and do not seem to be reflected in the observations via logs and other open response 
questions of what they actually did in the task with regards to their actual openness 
to change. This further strengthens the call for more qualitative, and mixed method 
observation studies in a variety of contexts in order to observe participants and 
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what they actually do in knowledge formation.  
 
Conclusions 
The current study provides some evidence for the proposed model of 
epistemic cognition. Quantitatively all three components at the domain general 
level: epistemic development, motivations, and strategies, were shown to be linked 
to some aspect of epistemic behaviors in context. Contextual influences were also 
shown to influence perceptions of sufficiency of information in forming opinions in 
the given context. However, mixed method analyses provided evidence that there 
are differences in individual approaches to justification that vary with individuals 
who fall high or low on the proposed components. Additionally, the mixed method 
analysis provided indication that interest in a topic may differentially influence 
individuals high and low in epistemic strategy use, providing some explanation of 
the quantitative results that indicated no direct influence of context on epistemic 
behaviors and suggesting a role in the model of epistemic cognition for a latent 
variable not depicted in the current theoretical model. Therefore, although some 
aspects of the proposed model are supported, it is clear that there are factors 
unaccounted for by the current model and which were not captured by the research 
design and instruments used in this study. The findings also indicate the need to 
add to the model a depiction of the ongoing influence of context on standard setting 
beyond the initial standards set when faced with the problem. 
It is clear from these findings that further data needs to be collected and 
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different types of studies pursued with more authentic observations of individuals in 
knowledge forming contexts. Continued used of qualitative and mixed method 
design will allow for in-depth investigations of the possible influences on epistemic 
cognition. Quantitative cross-lagged designs also need to be conducted in order to 
investigate possible reciprocal influences between epistemic development, 
strategies, and motivations over time in order to see whether it might be possible to 
support development through, strategy instruction or cueing different epistemic 
motivations. Further instrument development for this purpose would be necessary, 
it is clear that the RCI has some problems of reliability with so few items to capture 
the soft-stage model, and this problem would likely be exacerbated over the course 
of a longitudinal study. For epistemic strategies, the instrument adapted from 
Hennessey (2007) shows some promise. However, further validation of the 
significant adaptations is necessary. It is also clear from the mixed-method portion 
of the analysis that there are other latent variables at work in the influences of the 
three proposed individual components of the epistemic cognition model. The next 
step in investigation may be to go back to the methods employed by Perry (1970) 
and conduct more qualitative grounded-theory designs in order to deeply 
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Appendix A: Demographic Information 
 















 American Indian 
 Caucasian, not of Hispanic Origin 
 Hispanic 
Other (please specify): _____________________________ 
 
 














Appendix B: Pre-Task Survey 
Thinking about the question “Should OU spend any of its budget on purchasing 
and promoting the use of hand sanitizer on campus?” please respond to the 
following survey items. 













1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. I find this topic interesting .............................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. It is important that I understand the issues 
of this topic before forming an opinion...........................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Making the wrong decision on this issue 
could impact me negatively ...........................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Reading about the issues before I make a 
decision on this question is important ............................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. This topic is interesting to me ........................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. It is important to me that I read about the 
issues before answering this question..............................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Forming the wrong opinion on this issue 
could impact my health or that of my family 
members and close friends .............................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I think this is an interesting topic....................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. There is a personal risk to me of making the 
wrong decision ..............................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I have already encountered a great deal of 
information on this subject.............................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement below: 













-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
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Appendix C: Task Web Pages 













































Appendix D: Post-Task Survey 
Thinking about the question “Should OU spend any of its budget on purchasing 
and promoting the use of hand sanitizer on campus?” please respond to the 
following survey items. 
 
Indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement: 














1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Having looked at some of the available information, what is your opinion on 
whether hand sanitizer should be purchased and promoted in universities?  
 
 




Which sources did you choose to read? 
 thisispublichealthusf.blogspot.com: Hand Sanitizer: Killing Germs on the Go! 
 www.whiteowlconspiracy.com: Think hand sanitizers protect you against 
germs? Think again... 
 www.livestrong.com: Risks Of Hand Sanitizers 
 www.livestrong.com: Advantages Of Alcohol Hand Sanitizer 
 www.washingtonpost.com: Handing out diplomas with a side of a clean - The 
Washington Post 
 www.livescience.com: Hand Sanitizer at Work May Lower the Number of Sick 
Days... 
 www.infectioncontroltoday.com: Researchers Study Hand Sanitizers and 
Norovirus Risk 
 www.infectioncontroltoday.com: CDC's Endorsement of Alcohol Hand Rubs 





Why did you choose those sources? 
 
 
Which sources did you think were the most helpful? 
 

















Hand Sanitizer: Killing Germs on 
the Go! 
1 2 3 4  0 
www.whiteowlconspiracy.com: 
Think hand sanitizers protect you 
against germs? Think again... 
1 2 3 4  0 
www.livestrong.com: 
Risks Of Hand Sanitizers 
1 2 3 4  0 
www.livestrong.com: 
Advantages Of Alcohol Hand 
Sanitizer 
1 2 3 4  0 
www.washingtonpost.com: 
Handing out diplomas with a side 
of a clean - The Washington Post 
1 2 3 4  0 
www.livescience.com: 
Hand Sanitizer at Work May 
Lower the Number of Sick Days... 
1 2 3 4  0 
www.infectioncontroltoday.com: 
Researchers Study Hand Sanitizers 
and Norovirus Risk 
1 2 3 4  0 
www.infectioncontroltoday.com: 
CDC's Endorsement of Alcohol 
Hand Rubs Launches New Era in 
Hand Hygiene 
1 2 3 4  0 
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Appendix E: Attitudes, Beliefs, and Experiences Scale – Short Form 
Directions: Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree 
with each according to your attitudes, beliefs, and experiences. It is important for 
you to realize that there are no “right” or “wrong” answers to these questions. 
People are different, and we are interested in how you feel. Please respond 
according to the following 6-point scale by marking the proper number in the space 















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. Even after I've made up my mind about something, I 
am always eager to consider a different opinion..............1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I don't like situations that are uncertain. .........................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I dislike questions which could be answered in many 
different ways................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the 
reason why an event occurred in my life.........................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what 
everyone else in a group believes....................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. When I am confused about an important issue, I feel 
very upset......................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is 
right and which is wrong. ..............................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. When considering most conflict situations, I can 
usually see how both sides could be right........................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. When thinking about a problem, I consider as many 
different opinions on the issue as possible.......................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I like to know what people are thinking all the time. .......1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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11. It's annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to 
make up his or her mind. ...............................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are 
very different from my own. ..........................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. I feel uncomfortable when someone's meaning or 
intention is unclear to me. .............................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. I always see many possible solutions to problems I 
face...............................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. I'd rather know bad news than stay in a state of 
uncertainty....................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. I do not usually consult many different opinions before 
forming my own view....................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Scoring: 
Reverse Coded: 1, 8, 9, 12, 14 
Discomfort with ambiguity: 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 15 
Closed-mindedness 1, 3, 5, 8, 9, 12, 14, 16 
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Appendix F: Need For Cognition Scale 
Directions: The following statements represent how students may feel about 
thinking and reasoning.  Read each statement and indicate the extent to which it is 














1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. ...................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a 
situation that requires a lot of thinking. ..........................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. ......................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I would rather do something that requires little 
thought than something that is sure to challenge my 
thinking abilities............................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is 
likely chance I will have to think in depth about 
something. ....................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and long for 
hours. ...........................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I only think as hard as I have to. ....................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-
term ones. .....................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve 
learned them. ................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to 
the top appeals to me.....................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with 
new solutions to problems. ............................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very 
much. ...........................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must 
solve. ............................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. ......1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and 
important to one that is somewhat important but 
does not require much thought.......................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a 
task that required a lot of mental effort. ..........................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; 
I don’t care how or why it works....................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when 
they do not affect me personally.....................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix G: Adapted Epistemic Belief Scale 
Instructions: Think about how you approach learning about a new topic across a 
variety of different areas and subjects. Use the following scale to indicate how often 
you use each of the following strategies to try to make sense of information and 
form an opinion. 







of the time 
Sometimes 
About 50% 
of the time 
Frequently 
About 









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. I look at the links between as many concepts as possible .........1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I make connections between the topic and other concepts I 
already understand ................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I look for examples that make sense given my current 
understanding .......................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I look for examples that show how reasoning can be 
confirmed by evidence...........................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I think about how new information builds on what I 
already understand ................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I verify new information by looking at more evidence.............1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I look for examples that provide observable evidence..............1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I relate my understanding of new information to my direct 
observations ..........................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I focus on information that is based on evidence rather 
than opinion..........................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I make judgments based on whether or not explanations 
are based on observable evidence. ..........................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I think about whether new information aligns with my 
current understanding............................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. I think about whether examples reinforce my basic 
understanding .......................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. I reflect on whether my thinking aligns with the available 
evidence................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. I focus on understanding a few core concepts .........................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
184 
 
15. I look for explanations that show how new information is 
related to numerous concepts.................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. I think about how new information could be explained 
using information that everyone already understands..............1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. I reflect on whether the conclusion would be evident to 
everyone ...............................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. I inform my understandings by looking for more evidence ......1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. I reflect on how new information connects with my 
existing understandings .........................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. I think about whether information is consistent with what 
I already understand..............................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. I justify my understandings by looking at the available 
evidence................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. I look for explanations of the topic that build on basic 
understandings ......................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. I check my conclusions by referring to evidence......................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24. I reflect on the evidence for my thinking.................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25. I examine the links between concepts .....................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26. I look for information that shows how concepts are related.....1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27. I make sure that my reasoning is based on evidence................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28. I look for examples that show how concepts are related. .........1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29. I begin building my understanding of a topic by looking at 
the underlying ideas. .............................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30. I try to see what conclusions about the topic I would arrive 




foundationalism: 5, 12, 14, 16, 17, 22, 29, 30 
coherentism: 1, 2, 3, 11, 15, 19, 20, 25, 26, 28 
reliabilism: 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 18, 21, 23, 24, 27 
185 
 
Appendix H: Sample RCI Item 
 
 
